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ARTICLE 
MAKE LAW, NOT WAR: SOLVING THE FAITH/EQUALITY 
CRISIS 
Anton Sorkin† 
“For, happily, the Government of the United States, which gives 
to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only 
that they who live under its protection should demean 
themselves as good citizens in giving it on all occasions their 
effectual support.”  
 
George Washington1 
ABSTRACT 
Within the last few years, there have been a number of cases moving 
through streams of state litigation involving small business owners who 
open their businesses to the public and get in trouble for refusing to serve 
members of the LGBT community. In all of these instances, the issue that 
the employees are contesting is that their refusal to provide some specific 
service is disconnected from the customer’s sexual orientation, but is, 
instead, linked to the seeming endorsement of the activity for which the 
service is provided (e.g., a wedding cake goes towards endorsing the 
marriage). Courts, for the most part, have ignored this distinction and 
treated refusals to provide a requested service as a per se rejection of that 
person’s identity because the activity is considered to be “inextricably” 
connected with that person’s dignity (e.g., marriage for homosexuality).  
This Article argues that this “non-distinction approach” is really a legal 
fiction (something counter to known facts), which advances the interest of 
the court in using antidiscrimination laws for the sake of socially 
engineering an atmosphere that protects the LGBT-community from 
                                                                                                                                      
 † Anton Sorkin (JD, LLM, SJD Candidate) is an employment attorney in Atlanta and a 
doctorate student working part-time with the Restoring Religious Freedom Project at the 
Center for the Study of Law & Religion (Emory University School of Law). I’d like to 
acknowledge Professors Mark Goldfeder and Craig Stern for their helpful feedback on the 
topic. This Article was first presented at the Fourth ICLARs Conference at St. Hugh’s College 
in Oxford, England on September 8-11, 2016.  
 1. George Washington, Letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, in 
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 6:825 (Aug. 21, 1790) (W.W. Abbot et al. ed. 1987) 
(emphasis added). 
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dignitary harm. While an important process, the pursuit has incorrectly 
conflated the forms of discrimination (i.e., identity vs. conduct) thereby 
disarming the potential for First Amendment defenses to shine light on the 
conflict.  
My solution is simple. Courts should replace the legal fiction (i.e., the 
non-distinction approach) with a rebuttable presumption. They can still 
assume that the discriminatory intent is the type that should be covered 
under antidiscrimination laws, but also should provide an opportunity for 
religious claimants to rebut that presumption by: (1) showing a sincerely 
held belief; (2) showing that the requested service is part of those expressive 
acts protected by the First Amendment; and (3) showing that readily 
alternative means exist for acquiring the sought after services. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, the American culture has seen a raging war between 
two rival communities in their effort for increased recognition in the legal 
market.2 On one side, the religious liberty community realized a major 
victory in the 2014 case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, when the Supreme Court 
fortified the protections granted under the federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act by enshrining traditional, high-level protection for religious 
claimants lost after Employment Division v. Smith.3 On the other side, the 
LGBT-community gained a decisive victory in 2015, when the Supreme 
Court legalized same-sex marriage across all fifty states.4 Despite each 
having gained important legal victories, both communities find themselves 
at an impasse, progressively in search of what religious liberty expert 
Douglas Laycock calls a “total win.”5  
                                                                                                                                      
 2. Richard Garnett, Wrongful Discrimination?, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY 
RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 70 (Timothy S. Shah et al 
eds., 2016); see also SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICT 
(Douglas Laylock et al eds., 2008). 
 3. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2772 (2014); Emp’t Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 4. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015); see also Linda C. McClain, Civil 
Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, “Moral Disapproval,” and Tensions between Religious Liberty 
and Equality, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPE, supra note 2, at 95–108 (previewing relevant US Supreme Court 
jurisprudence leading up to Obergefell). 
 5. Steven D. Smith, Die and Let Live? The Asymmetry of Accommodation, in RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, supra 
note 2, at 182 (noting that Douglas Laycock believes a mutual compromise has not been 
reached because both parties are “intransigent” and want a “total win”). As noted by 
Professor Robin F. Wilson: “History shows that compromise facilitates social progress” and 
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While both communities have found success in the courts, they remain 
facing many challenges. On one hand, the LGBT-community continues 
fighting to be recognized in their persons and in their lifestyles; to leave 
behind those times in the aftermath of the Second World War where the 
law and social conventions challenged the very notion that “gays and 
lesbians had a just claim to dignity.”6 From the 1990s until very recently, the 
United States saw a clash of political and ideological battles waging between 
the so-called religious right and the LGBT-community over the extension of 
rights for gay couples.7 As a shadow of things to come, in March of 1993, 
                                                                                                                                      
“[o]nly compromise will yield significant protections for religious objectors and significant 
protections for the LGBT community against discrimination.” Robin F. Wilson, The Politics 
of Accommodation, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, supra note 2, at 133, 136. Two sources in particular illustrate the 
intransigence noted by Douglas Laycock. See Joseph William Singer, We Don't Serve Your 
Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 931 (2015) 
(the “biblical support” used in favor of segregation has been “revived by businesses seeking 
to deny services to LGBT customers . . . .”); Shannon Gilreath & Arley Ward, Same-Sex 
Marriage, Religious Accommodation, and the Race Analogy, WAKE FOREST UNIV. LEGAL 
STUDIES PAPER NO. 2748565, at 4 (2016) (“campaign for the continued second-class 
citizenship of gay Americans under the banner of religious liberty is gaining vengeful 
steam”), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2748565. 
Douglas Laycock offers the advice for both sides that to insist on a total victory for only your 
side is bad for liberty. Jaime Margolis, Freedom of Religion vs. Sexual Freedom—A Conflict 
Between Liberties? B.U. SCH. OF L. (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://www.bu.edu/law/2015/02/18/freedom-of-religion-vs-sexual-freedom-a-conflict-
between-liberties/; see also John McCormack, UVA Law Prof Who Supports Gay Marriage 
Explains Why He Supports Indiana's Religious Freedom Law, WEEKEND STANDARD (Mar. 29, 
2015), http://www.weeklystandard.com/uva-law-prof-who-supports-gay-marriage-explains-
why-he-supports-indianas-religious-freedom-law/article/902928 (Laycock notes that 
“[m]ost of the activists in this fight, on both sides, want liberty and justice only for their side . 
. . to crush the other side”); Doug Mainwaring, Same-Sex Marriage: We’re Playing Chess, Not 
Checkers, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/03/9622/ (“national discussion of same-sex 
marriage treats the issue like a game of checkers, where opponents can quickly gain each 
other’s pieces without much forethought about the consequences”). 
 6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct at 2596. This history has been thoroughly outlined by William 
Eskridge—serving as a reminder of our collective failure to treat the gay community equally. 
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAY LAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE 
CLOSET (1999). 
 7. Donald P. Haider, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, in AFTER MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
42 (Carolos A. Ball ed., 2016). Very recently in fact, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a 
prior ruling and set a date in March for oral argument on the issue of whether same-sex 
spousal benefits should be provided for municipal employees. Associated Press, Texas Court 
Hearing Case to Limit Gay Marriage Legalization, FORTUNE (Jan. 21, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/01/21/gay-marriage-legalization-texas/. 
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the Hawaii Supreme Court issued a ruling where it questioned the 
constitutionality of denying same-sex couples the right to marry.8 That 
same year, in November, President Bill Clinton signed into law the 
“Religious Freedom Restoration Act” (RFRA) that extended robust 
protection for the free exercise of religion in response to the Supreme Court 
ruling in Employment Division v. Smith.9 Today, RFRA is considered to be 
among the major impediments to LGBT-equality.10 On the other side, 
decisions like Romer v. Evans (1996), Lawrence v. Texas (2003), and United 
States v. Windsor (2013) have become landmark cases helping advance the 
“lived equality” goals of modern advocates for the LGBT-community.11 
With same-sex marriage finally legalized and the United States having 
overcome its sultry practices of criminalizing homosexuality,12 much work 
still remains in ensuring that the LGBT-community is protected from 
widespread bullying and discrimination,13 which impairs their ability to 
                                                                                                                                      
 8. See CARLOS A. BALL, Introduction, in AFTER MARRIAGE EQUALITY 2–3 (2016) (citing 
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)). 
 9. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–13 (1997). 
 10. See HAIDER, supra note 7, at 46–48.  
 11. See Clifford Rosky, Still Not Equal, in AFTER MARRIAGE EQUALITY 74 (Carlos A. Ball 
ed., 2016) (“measured by reference to ‘equality of outcomes and community well-being’”). 
 12. William N. Eskridge, in his comprehensive recitation of the history of legal 
regulations involving the LGBT-community, writes of laws throughout history against 
homosexual conduct and the potential for police brutality as a response to things like, e.g., 
“dancing with someone of the same-sex, cross-dressing, propositioning another adult 
homosexual, possessing a homophile publication, writing about homosexuality without 
disapproval, displaying pictures” or having actual sexual intercourse, a felony in all but one 
state, that often times came with it “possible indefinite incarceration as a sexual psychopath.” 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 98. 
 13. See BALL, supra note 8, at 6 (“It is a grave mistake to believe that the favorable 
resolution of the marriage equality questions somehow represent the end of the struggle for 
LGBT equality in this country.”). A recent report from the Human Rights Watch 
demonstrates this fact when it outlines on-going trends showing how the modern school 
system remains a hostile environment for LGBT-students. Ryan Thoreson, “Like Walking 
Through a Hailstorm:” Discrimination Against LGBT Youth in US Schools”, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/07/walking-through-
hailstorm/discrimination-against-lgbt-youth-us-schools. On top of this, the LGBT-
community remains in wait for statewide protection against sexual orientation 
discrimination in housing, hiring, and public accommodations. Wilson, supra note 5, at 133, 
149; HAIDER, supra note 7, at 50–51 (provides Table illustrating states that passed 
employment antidiscrimination laws in relation to when those states reached marriage 
equality); Maps of State Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (interactive map), 
http://www.hrc.org/state_maps; see also ROSKY, supra note 11, at 75 (“[a] freedom to marry . 
. . doesn't mean nearly as much when you’re unemployed, homeless, uninsured, or 
imprisoned”).  
2018] MAKE LAW, NOT WAR 667 
 
enjoy the fruits of their “new” citizenship.14 On the other side, religious 
liberty has also faced a number of recent challenges, particularly in the 
context of public accommodation laws where the conscience of Christians 
collides with service requests made by gay-couples in anticipation of 
wedding ceremonies. Richard Samuelson, writing in Mosaic Magazine, 
notes this much when he writes that personal identity in the context of the 
gay-rights movement “has resulted in a legal battle in which the radioactive 
charge of ‘discrimination,’ borrowed from the civil-rights movement of the 
1960s, is wielded as a weapon to isolate, impugn, and penalize dissenting 
views held by Americans of faith and informing the conduct of their 
religious lives.”15  
The material below discusses this conflict in great detail while attempting 
to pry open the spaces for distinguishing the type of discrimination as a 
society we are rightfully mindful to eradicate, and the type that falls within 
the protections of the First Amendment. It attempts to find common 
ground toward establishing limiting principles in order to restore a rightful 
relationship between two warring communities in an effort to restore a 
                                                                                                                                      
 14. As noted by Professor Clifford Rosky, now that the battle over marriage has been 
won, the shift will be towards a comprehensive effort towards passing antidiscrimination 
laws—particularly among “red states.” ROSKY, supra note 11, at 79; see also HAIDER, supra 
note 7, at 54 (early advocate for marriage equality in Massachusetts envisioned their work to 
be an effort to ensure everyone across the state can go “cradle to grave without 
discrimination and oppression based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender 
expression”). I say “new” given the second-class citizenship status placed on the LGBT-
community akin to the second-class citizenship faced by the black community that placed 
them in a position of “walled-off inferiority.” Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the 
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960). Eskridge notes that he believes this 
“second-class” status remained as of 1999, when things like laws against marriage and 
sodomy remained that have now been lifted. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 139; see also 
Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meaning, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1267, 1308 (2011) (“[l]aws banning same-sex marriage also appear to brand 
citizens as second-class”). For example, in 1962, Frank Kameny led a movement soliciting 
then Attorney General Robert Kennedy for the gay community to be granted equal 
citizenship beginning with the fight against employment discrimination. See ESKRIDGE, supra 
note 6, at 125. Eskridge writes that by 1981, the gay right movement had won many 
important victories that “partially dismantled the apartheid of the closet, whereby gay people 
were formally excluded from citizenship and left to a sociopolitical state of nature.” Id. at 
139.  
 15. Richard Samuelson, “Who’s Afraid of Religious Liberty?,” MOSAIC (Aug. 1, 2016), 
https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/2016/08/whos-afraid-of-religious-liberty/. Perhaps no 
academic has been more strident than Wake Forest Professor Shannon Gilreath, who writes 
that distinguishing anti-gay discrimination with anti-black discrimination is merely a 
“convenient smoke screen enabling bigots to mask their true animus.” Gilreath, supra note 5, 
at 9. 
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much-needed balance in our society. Section II discusses the broader 
purposes of antidiscrimination laws and the various themes interwoven 
throughout this Article. Section III discusses the important cases that have 
yielded courts applying the non-distinction approach in conflicts between 
the religious and LGBT-community. Section IV delves into the history and 
use of legal fictions of the type being used in cases found in the antecedent 
Section. Section V discusses the non-distinction approach introduced in 
Section III, then responds to some of the arguments used by courts to 
conflate the forms of discrimination and offers a three-part analysis to 
replace the current approach that allows for religious claimants to offer First 
Amendment defenses toward accommodation.  
II.  ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
Antidiscrimination laws, in particular those exemplified in response to 
invidious discrimination against the African-American community, at their 
basis, have the policy of social transformation.16 These policies reflect 
“evolving conceptions of equality tracing back” to the Declaration of 
Independence that announced that “all men are created equal” by virtue of 
an immutable Creator.17 As a result, antidiscrimination laws seek to move a 
culture towards equality, if not through an organic process of independent 
decision-making, then through a form of social engineering or social 
                                                                                                                                      
 16. See Robert C. Post, The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, in PREJUDICIAL 
APPEARANCES 20 (2001) (“Antidiscrimination law understands itself as transformative, as 
fundamentally altering existing social arrangements”); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, 
Religious Accommodations, and the Purpose of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 619, 
627 (2015) (“they are the amelioration of economic inequality, the prevention of dignitary 
harm, and the stigmatization of discrimination”); Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public 
Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177, 179, 191 (2015) 
(“a fundamental purpose of antidiscrimination law . . . is to change norms”); see also ROSKY, 
supra note 11, at 77 (“antidiscrimination laws . . . signal the public inclusion of LGBT people 
within the community itself”). Koppelman writes: “Antidiscrimination law is an intervention 
that aims at systemic effect in society, dismantling longstanding structures of dominance and 
subordination.” Koppelman, supra, at 639. According to Robert C. Post, American 
antidiscrimination law is driven by a logic “that expresses the essential principles of post-
World War II American liberalism . . . stress[ing] both the inherent dignity of each 
individual and the need for a rational and efficient economy.” Robert C. Post, The Logic of 
American Antidiscrimination Law, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES 1 (2001). 
 17. Brief of Legal Scholars in Support of Equality and Religious and Expressive Freedom 
as Amici Curiae, in Support of Appellants, State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers; Ingersoll 
and Freed v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 91615-2, at 11 [hereinafter “Legal Scholar’s Brief”], 
available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A08/916152%20Amici%20-
%20Legal%20Scholars.pdf; see also Carlos A. Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC 
L. REV. 639, 642 (2016) (“assessments of bigotry . . . change as society changes”). 
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reconstruction.18 As stated by Joseph Singer, antidiscrimination laws ensure 
that despised groups enjoy equal “access to the world of the market without 
regard to invidious discrimination.”19 As a consequence of this thinking, the 
question posed by ACLU legal counsel, Louise Melling, is illustrative of the 
grand narrative of this Article: “Why grant accommodations for religious 
objectors in today’s anti-discrimination laws when similar calls were 
rejected in the context of civil rights?”20 
A. The Koppelman Balance 
Andrew Koppelman helpfully outlines the role that antidiscrimination 
laws play as tools for social engineering.21 He writes that such laws serve a 
transformative function in society—by not only changing the structure 
through state action,22 but also changing the conscience of bigotry.23 While 
focusing primarily on the role antidiscrimination laws played in eliminating 
racism, Koppelman lays out the principles equally applicable for ridding so-
called bigotry against the LGBT-community, noting that “we cannot do 
                                                                                                                                      
 18. See Koppelman, supra note 16, at 651. 
 19. Singer, supra note 5, at 939.  
 20. Melling, supra note 16, at 183. Melling characteristically comes down on the side of 
rejecting any form of accommodation, which remains consistent with the ACLU’s approach 
to the issue. Id. at 185. 
 21. Koppelman’s own approach to reconciling the “refusal to serve the LGBT-
community” dilemma involves a right for the religious business owners stating their 
concerns ahead of time to avoid the dignitary harm that comes (particularly) from a face-to-
face refusal. Koppelman, supra note 16, at 628, 646–47; Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech 
Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2016). 
 22. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY 7 (1996) 
(“[T]his project of cultural transformation is one in which the state is appropriately enlisted 
where it can be helpful.”); Koppelman, supra note 16, at 620 (“Gay rights advocates have 
misconceived the tort of discrimination as a particularized injury to the person, rather than 
the artifact of social engineering that it really is.”). 
 23. Koppelman notes that from the standpoint of racism, transformation must be made 
in not only the condition of blacks, but also the consciousness of whites. KOPPELMAN, supra 
note 22, at 2. Martin Luther King made similar utterances, poignantly appealing to the 
conscience of the nation to see the disease of racism:  
Like a boil that can never be cured as long as it is covered up but must be 
opened with all its pus-flowing ugliness to the natural medicines of air and 
light, injustice must likewise be exposed, with all of the tension its exposure 
creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before 
it can be cured. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF 
HOPE 295 (1986). 
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justice to [traditionally oppressed] groups unless we change our very 
patterns of cultural expression and unconscious thinking.”24  
However, Koppelman also mentions competing traditional and liberal 
concerns that he goes on to address in the pursuit of social equality.25 Being 
mindful that the “scope is limited . . . by the very magnitude of the evil it 
seeks to combat,” Koppelman warns that without a proper understanding of 
the goals and the corresponding level of danger,26 antidiscrimination laws 
used toward social change will fail to strike a proper balance.27 Most 
importantly, Koppelman notes that antidiscrimination laws should not 
always trump other values, echoing the words of Edmund Burke, who said 
that “it is better that the whole should be imperfect . . . than that, while 
some parts are provided for with great exactness, others might be totally 
neglected, or perhaps materially injured, by the over-care of a favourite [sic] 
member.”28 While in some instances an established orthodoxy may be 
imposed; in other areas, religious claimants should be provided opportunity 
to appeal to the devices of argumentation and convince decision-makers to 
rule in their favor.29   
                                                                                                                                      
 24. KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 7. “[T]he ultimate goal of antidiscrimination law is to 
eliminate not merely racial inequality but racism itself.” Id. at 9. 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. Where “the evil is local or of a modest scale, then measures to remedy it may be 
correspondingly confined;” however, where the “evil is broad and pervasive, then the effort 
to end it must be a correspondingly broad and ambitious project.” Id. at 13. 
 27. Id. at 11.  
 28. KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 109. 
 29. Id. at 113; see also Brief for Petitioners, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 2000 WL 
228616, at 47 (2000) (“It is our belief that controversial questions of personal morality, often 
involving religious conviction, are best tested and resolved within the private marketplace of 
ideas, and not as the subject of government-imposed orthodoxy.”). As Koppelam notes, one 
of the paradoxes of his antidiscrimination laws as social transformation project is that it 
“requires both intellectual conformity and intellectual courage, and these requirements work 
at cross-purposes.” KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 113. Later on, he cites to Rawls in claiming 
that a liberal state, in some instances, is entitled to take “steps to strengthen the virtues of 
toleration ad mutual trust, say by discouraging various kinds of religious and racial 
discrimination (in ways consistent with liberty of conscience and freedom of speech).” Id. at 
196. Antidiscrimination principles allows us to return to the “original position” and move 
forward unencumbered by prejudices. See Robert C. Post, The Logic of American 
Antidiscrimination Law, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES 16, 19 (2001) (antidiscrimination laws 
spring “from the noble liberal impulse to protect persons from the indignities of prejudicial 
mistreatment”). The contribution from Maggie Gallagher however is important in wrestling 
with the dangers of equality as opposed to an emphasis on liberty: 
Liberty arguments lead to pluralism, which requires us to tolerate those with 
whom we disagree and affirm their core rights. Equality arguments lead to the 
expansion of state power to repress and marginalize anti-equality bigots. The 
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B. Dignitary, Harm & Stigmatization 
Another thread that runs throughout this Article and relates closely to 
the discussion of social transformation is the underlying focus on ridding 
stigma30 and dignitary harm—including harms to children,31 harms from 
pressure to conform with heteronormative stereotypes based on fears of 
discrimination,32 and the humiliation of being denied service in places open 
to the public.33 In Koppleman’s iteration of the “stigma theory,” he outlines 
leading thinkers on the subject in an effort to show the dignitary harm 
associated with discrimination is one meant to disenfranchise the individual 
from full-participation in society.34 As a result, a “society devoted to the idea 
                                                                                                                                      
fusion of liberty and equality rights in the gay rights debates represents the 
biggest intellectual and conceptual challenge to finding a path to pluralism. 
Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 5 Nw. 
J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 260, 270 (2010). Samuel Gregg makes the observation that egalitarianism 
tends to destroy the distinctiveness of religion and reduce it to “inoffensive banalities”—
rendered ineffectual to speak truth and to teach virtue. Samuel Gregg, Tocqueville and 
Democracy’s Fall in America, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Jan, 19, 2017), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2017/01/18147/; see also Kurt Vonnegut, Harrison 
Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7 (2014) (“The Year was 2081, and everybody 
was finally equal. They weren't only equal before God and the law. They were equal every 
which way. Nobody was smarter than anybody else. Nobody was better looking than 
anybody else. Nobody was stronger or quicker than anybody else.”). 
 30. “One goal of antidiscrimination protection of gay people is cultural transformation: 
to stigmatize stigma, and make the prejudicial that had been pervasive in society into 
something that citizens instinctively reject.” Koppelman, supra note 16, at 649. 
 31. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600–01 (stating that the “marriage laws at issue thus 
harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples”). 
 32. Paul Vincent Courtney, Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Public 
Accommodations: A Common Law Approach, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1534 (2015). 
 33. Singer, supra note 5, at 940-41 (stating that the “question is whether a storeowner 
has a right, in a free and democratic society, to treat a customer like a pariah”). As the 
Supreme Court said, “Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and 
movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely feel 
when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public.” Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Koppelman and others 
have also done well to illustrate the consequential harm that comes with being refused 
service independent of an intent to discriminate. KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 57-114; 
Koppelman, supra note 16, at 644–53; Ball, supra note 17, at 649–50 (pointing out that 
Justice Kennedy in Obergefell did not tie harm and stigma to intent or state of mind for those 
who voted to defend traditional marriage, instead focusing “exclusively on the 
consequences”). 
 34. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 58-59; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 
Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 
(1977) ("the essence of any stigma lies in the fact that the affected individual is regarded as an 
unequal in some respect”); see also STEVEN B. SMITH, HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM: 
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of equal citizenship . . . will repudiate those inequalities that impose the 
stigma of caste.”35  
As it relates to the treatment of blacks, Justice Warren echoed this 
principle in the context of school segregation when he said that to “separate 
them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”36 
Likewise, Justice Kennedy in Obergefell noted that to deny the same-sex 
couple an equal right to marry is to “impose stigma and injury of the kind 
prohibited by our basic charter.”37 With this in mind, it makes sense why 
legal intervention provides a benefit for those being harmed filtered 
through a lens of creating a more just culture.38 As Steven B. Smith writes in 
reflection on Hegel’s Theory of Rights, the desire for recognition by those 
around us is “the standard by which to judge the adequacy of our political 
institutions and the quality of our civic life.”39 
Further, Koppelman connects history as a basis for placing the stigma 
theory central to antidiscrimination norms, namely the eradication of 
“badges and incident of slavery”40 or “to eradicate the last vestiges and 
incidents of a society half slave and half free.”41 Recall that in the aftermath 
                                                                                                                                      
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 117 (1989) (“For the desire for recognition is a desire unlike others. It is 
a socially mediated desire insofar as the enjoyment of respect depends upon gaining the 
approbation of others.”) Also illustrative is Koppelman’s cite to Paul Brest, who writes: 
A second and independent rationale for the antidiscrimination principle is the 
prevention of the harms which may result from race-dependent decisions. 
Often, the most obvious harm is the denial of the opportunity to secure a 
desired benefit — a job, a night's lodging at a motel, a vote. But this does not 
completely describe the consequences of race-dependent decision making. 
Decisions based on assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indifference 
inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their victims as inferior. Moreover, 
because acts of discrimination tend to occur in pervasive patterns, their victims 
suffer especially frustrating, cumulative and debilitating injuries. 
Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1976). 
 35. KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 59. 
 36. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (emphasis added). 
 37. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
 38. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? 107 (2009). 
 39. SMITH, supra note 34, at 117. We can envision the role of antidiscrimination laws 
similar to how Hegel saw the role of the political order in seeking to rectify the “inadequacies 
of nature.” Id. at 115.  
 40. Cf. Singer, supra note 5, at 933, 941 (noting that a Mississippi statute to this day 
allows businesses to choose their customers “at will”). 
 41. SMITH, supra note 34, at 63 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440, 
441 n.78 (1968)). 
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of the Civil War, so-called Black Codes aimed to restore the black 
community to their place of servitude.42 These racist counter-measures 
required increasing efforts by courts, legislators (particularly 
antidiscrimination laws), and social movements to undo in order for the 
society to shed itself of its depravity. Corresponding with concerns that 
many states have failed to pass adequate laws to protect the LGBT 
community,43 Professor Joseph W. Singer describes the comparable absence 
of remedy at common law in New York against race-based discrimination 
at retail stores in the absence of civil rights statutes.44 As noted by other 
writers, progress was slow—as of 1949, only eighteen states took the added 
measure of enacting public accommodations statutes to protect the black 
community from invidious discrimination—demanding for a social 
movement to expedite the process of equality.45 On top of this, Michael J. 
Klarman notes how “opinion polls in the 1950s revealed that over 90 
percent of whites, even outside the South, opposed interracial marriage.”46 
By the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, only one black child in one 
hundred attended mixed race schools in the South.47 A social movement 
was necessary because, in the words of Martin Luther King, “freedom is 
never voluntarily given by the oppressor;” it is not in its nature.48 
                                                                                                                                      
 42. See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283, 1350, 1352 (1996) (“[When] the Black Codes were passed, 
they were understood by everyone as attempts to deny freedom and equality rather than to 
promote them”); KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 13–14 (“Black Codes . . . [were] an attempt to 
restore slavery to the greatest extent consistent with formal emancipation”). 
 43. See Courtney, supra note 32, at 1500-01. 
 44. See Singer, supra note 42, 1290-91; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1996) 
(“The common-law rules, however, proved insufficient in many instances . . . . In 
consequence, most States have chosen to counter discrimination by enacting detailed 
statutory schemes.”). Joseph Singer describe these insufficiencies as follows:  
The presumption, in other words, is that businesses, as property owners, have 
the right to exclude non-owners unless that right is limited by statute. 
Businesses similarly have the right to refuse to contract with anyone with 
whom they do not wish to deal unless required to do so by express statutory 
command. This presumption appears to be the law in every jurisdiction in the 
United States except the State of New Jersey. 
Singer, supra note 42, at 1290; see also Courtney, supra note 32, at 1504–12 (discussing the 
common law duty to serve). 
 45. Courtney, supra note 32, at 1512–13; see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW 
TO CIVIL RIGHTS 363 (2004) (noting that without “broad social currents” like the civil right 
movement, courts would have accomplished even less in ending segregation). 
 46. KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 321. 
 47. Id. at 362. 
 48. MARTIN LUTHER KING, supra note 23, at 292. 
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These sentiments certainly make the present struggle of the LGBT-
community in similar need for widespread antidiscrimination laws. 
Koppelman notes that among the earliest victories for the gay rights 
movement was when some of the major institutions in America “embraced 
the view that discrimination against gay people is, in at least some respects, 
analogous to racism.”49 Today, taking on the lessons of history, the ACLU’s 
Deputy Legal Director, in comparing historical race-based discrimination 
with todays perceived sexual orientation discrimination, said that we cannot 
“remedy discrimination and historical exclusion if we sanction such 
indignities.”50  
                                                                                                                                      
 49. KOPPELMAN, supra note 38, at 45; see also DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CANT’ SAY THAT! 
11 (2003) (“[F]rom the late 1970s until the early 1990s courts abandoned civil liberties in 
favor of antidiscrimination principles with stunning blitheness”); Forum v. Rumsfeld, 390 
F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (“In the 1970s law schools began expanding 
[there discrimination] policies to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation”). 
Examples of this transformation can be seen, for example, in 1978 when Yale Law School 
included sexual orientation as part of their general policy against discrimination. Burt v. 
Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 166 (D. Conn. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Burt v. Gates, 502 F.3d 
183 (2d Cir. 2007). Further, in response to this trend “the American Association of Law 
Schools . . . voted unanimously in 1990 to include sexual orientation as a protected category.” 
Forum v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d at 224-25. Eskridge writes that since 1981, “an increasing 
number of states and cities ha[d] adopted laws affirmatively protecting gay people against 
private discrimination and violence.” ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 139. 
 50. Louise Melling, Will We Sanction Discrimination?: Can “Heterosexuals Only” be 
Among the Signs of Today?, 60 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 248, 253 (2013). What David 
Bernstein said about the ACLU a decade ago remains true today: “[T]he ACLU has become 
increasingly reluctant to defend civil liberties at the expense of antidiscrimination laws.” 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 153. For example, in the cases discussed in PART II, the ACLU 
has continuously refused to defend the religious liberty position. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Why 
is the ACLU on the Wrong Side of the Wedding Photographer Case?, CATO INST. (Nov. 22, 
2013) (Louise Melling said “the equal treatment of gay couples is more important than the 
free speech rights of commercial photographers”), https://www.cato.org/blog/why-aclu-
wrong-side-wedding-photographer-case; News Release, ACLU Seeks Remedies for Gay 
Couple Discriminated Against Florist, ACLU (Apr. 10, 2013) (ACLU attorney Michael Scott 
said: “when a business serves the general public, the business owner’s religious beliefs may 
not be used to justify discrimination”), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/aclu-seeks-remedies-
gay-couple-discriminated-against-florist. Louise Melling summarizes the ACLU’s position 
on which civil liberties issues it will defend well when she says that “Free exercise to religion 
gives us a right to our beliefs, but it doesn’t give us the right to harm others, doesn’t give us 
the right to impose our views on others, it doesn’t give us the right to discriminate.” Cheryl 
Wetzstein, Civil rights groups blast religious liberty acts, WASHINGTON TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/17/aclu-blasts-religious-liberty-acts-as-
licenses-to-/. Despite all this, and many more examples can be provided (especially in 
controversies over “reproductive rights”), the ACLU maintains that religious liberty is a 
fundamental right and that they are a “national leader in the struggle for religious freedom.” 
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With this background mind, Koppelman’s shift into the “Group-
Disadvantage Theory” brings full circle the discussion of harm and the need 
for antidiscrimination laws. From the perspective of the victim, no remedy 
is available to end the condition of so-called invidious discrimination in the 
past against African-Americans and now against gays51 without imposing 
norms by social and legal decisions.52 By aligning the present-day 
discrimination against the LGBT-community with the race-based 
discrimination of the past, society is able to impose wholesale restrictions 
on religious claimants—having become the heirs of the racists of old.53 That 
is the approach from one side of the debate. 
C. Status/Conduct Distinction 
The central theme of this Article is a focus on status/conduct distinctions 
in an effort to find room where First Amendment defenses can be invoked 
without losing the LGBT-community in the process. While some continue 
to operate under the assumption that the LGBT-community faces that same 
type of historic, religious-based animosity on the basis of status not conduct 
without clarification,54 others have offered helpful justifications. Professor 
Kenji Yoshino, for example, while recognizing a difference in the stated 
forms of discrimination between status and conduct, argues that the 
modern form is merely a sub-species of the same historic species of bigotry 
currently rooted in a form of “covering,” forcing homosexual identity to 
comply with norms of heteronormativity.55 Picking up on this argument, 
                                                                                                                                      
Religious Liberty, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/religious-liberty; The ACLU and 
Freedom of Religion and Belief, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-and-freedom-
religion-and-belief#_ednref1. 
 51. Cf. Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equality Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND 
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 128 n.67 (1977) (“[I]f we are told that today a period of perpetual 
subordination is about to begin for another group, we should be as concerned with the status 
of that group as we are with the blacks.”). 
 52. KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 78. 
 53. See William N. Eskridge, Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief, 
and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 657, 664–705 (2011) (traces 
religious use of the Bible to condemn blacks and homosexuals). 
 54. See, e.g., Melling, supra note 50, at 253 (2013) (“When it turns away a lesbian or gay 
couple, the inn that advertises as a destination-wedding site, or the bridal shop that opens its 
doors to the public, in effect posts a ‘Heterosexuals Only’ sign in its window.”).  
 55. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 21–22 
(2006). Taking the shift from outright bans on gay expression to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
that excludes on the basis of homosexual self-identity, Yoshino writes: 
This shift thus appears to represent progress for gays—no longer will they be 
excluded for their status, but only for their self-identification or conduct. Yet 
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Professor Douglas Nejaime offers a defense for moving the debate away 
from a focus on same-sex marriage and into the arena of antidiscrimination 
laws with an emphasis on relational identity in considering “limited 
religious exemptions.”56 
Professor Michael Dorf further points out that arguments for and against 
making a conduct/status distinction is merely an opportunistic tool given 
the shifting application of its use since Bowers, where gay right advocates 
argued that even if the state could criminalize certain conduct, it could not 
do so based on sexual orientation identity.57 On the other side, those who 
stood against expanding gay rights often refused to make the distinction 
often made today by casting all same-sex identity in the lens of deviant 
conduct.58  
On the other hand, many have argued that the type of discrimination 
faced by gay couples in the cases outlined in Section III does not amount to 
the same invidious discrimination faced by the black community of old. 
These cases have made efforts to properly distinguish the forms of 
discrimination by engaging in explanatory line drawing for the sake of 
protecting competing liberal values. While I deal with this extensively 
throughout the Article, one individual is worth mentioning at this point is 
Nathan A. Berkeley, who, while working for the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security as a policy analyst, provided an approach that shines a 
much needed light on the debate. He begins dealing with this controversy 
                                                                                                                                      
this shift has not improved the material or dignitary conditions of gays in the 
military, as homosexual self-identification and homosexual conduct are 
sufficiently central to gay identity that burdening such acts is tantamount to 
burdening gay status.  
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 778 (2002). Another example of this comes from 
Texas, where Big Earl's Bait House and Country Store refused to serve a gay couple, not 
because they were gay, but because they failed to conform to a pre-assigned norm for 
manliness. Courtney, supra note 32, at 1498–99. The author compares the motivation of Big 
Earl with the artistic services discussed throughout this article. Id. at 1518. I make the 
distinction in Section V. 
 56. Douglas Nejaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious 
Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 
1236–37 (2012). 
 57. Dorf, supra note 14, at 1313. 
 58. Id. (“[O]pponents of gay rights denied that the conduct/status distinction had 
normative force.”); Eskridge, supra note 53, at 685–705. In one sense, the difficult issue is 
whether both sides can come to a compromise as to what degree a person’s conduct makes 
up that person’s very identity. Where Christians do not consider that marriage or intercourse 
defines an individual having the luxury of enjoying these benefits without threat of 
government reprisal, the LGBT community has not and may very well consider those rights 
the very fabric of their being.  
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by first asking whether legitimate civil rights are, in fact, being violated, 
versus only the perception being driven by calculated references to the civil-
rights movement in an effort to gain the moral high ground.59 In his 
analysis, he is keen to distinguish areas of constitutional violations (whether 
due process or equal protection) where the state is rightfully responsible to 
step in (i.e., those linked to targeted invidious discrimination against 
“discrete, immutable attributes”) versus those ideological disagreements on 
human sexuality,60 which requires the state to remain neutral.61 He argues 
that when the state brings charges against defendants in an effort to uphold 
its antidiscrimination laws, they are in essence asking the courts to violate 
the stated principles in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Lawrence v. 
Texas—that it is the role of the courts to “define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate [its] own moral code.”62 With this in mind, Berkeley frames the 
issue fundamentally differently from Louise Melling by asking this: “Why 
should the majority be permitted to ‘use the power of the State’ via public 
accommodation laws, nondiscrimination laws, or other applications of due 
process or equal protection principles, to enforce the moral view that same-
sex sexual conduct must be accepted?”63  
Between Melling’s framing of the issue and the one offered by Berkeley, 
we have, what seems to be, an irreconcilable conflict. While creating much 
needed change for the black and LGBT-community by rightfully ridding 
invidious discrimination in various fields, antidiscrimination laws have also 
                                                                                                                                      
 59. Nathan A. Berkeley, Religious Freedom and LGBT Rights: Trading Zero Sum 
Approaches for Careful Distinctions and Genuine Pluralism, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2014-
2015). 
 60. Id. at 14–15. Berkeley notes that “refusing to affirm sexual expressions and 
associated relational forms, or forms of gender identity that may reduce human maleness 
and femaleness to matters of individual autonomy, are not prima facie offenses against 
human dignity and may be rooted in genuine religious convictions.” Id. at 15; see also 
Garnett, supra note 2, at 81 (“Discrimination is wrong when it denies or is intended to deny 
the equal dignity of every person . . . . [S]ometimes discrimination does this and sometimes it 
doesn't.”). 
 61. See Berkeley, supra note 59, at 17 (“[W]hen government includes the behavior 
dimension of sexual orientation in its efforts to enforce nondiscrimination laws, it is 
misguided.”).  
 62. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 
(1992); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003). “The [Supreme] Court made 
abundantly clear that neither state nor federal criminal law might be used to express 
majoritarian views on human sexuality and related sexual relationships and lifestyles . . . .” 
Berkeley, supra note 59, at 21. As Garnett prudently advises, “[C]ourts, officials, and 
governments should acknowledge and accept their limited competence and prerogative to 
resolve authoritatively these disagreements.” Garnett, supra note 2, at 84. 
 63. Berkeley, supra note 59, at 22.  
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come with great perils to our social structure.64 While I fully acknowledge 
that religious claimants, at times, must “be required to sacrifice for the 
public good,” that burden must remain “no greater than is necessary for 
achievement of that good and may not be imposed disproportionately on 
the religious.”65 Whatever the decision a business makes in the context of 
refusing to serve the LGBT-community, laws imposing penalties will only 
compound the likely reputational cost that comes with objecting.66  
As a final note, it is also important for those appealing to the right to 
exclude gays (regardless of intent) to know that from a historical 
standpoint, their claims are largely rooted in an “artifact of the Jim Crow 
era,” and not in a proper common law understanding of a duty to serve the 
public. 67 While this is not reason for capitulating, it is something that 
academics will use in the wider debate. While this Article does not go far 
enough in creating a rubric to instigate such changes to help my gay 
neighbor, I fully support those agencies that do and hope in the future to 
lend my support as a Christian.68 For now, we turn to the relevant cases 
where the refusal of service issues takes center stage. 
III.  THE NON-DISTINCTION APPROACH 
A number of important controversies have surfaced in the last five years 
that help illustrate the conflict between the religious and gay communities. 
                                                                                                                                      
 64. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 49 (laying a foundation of forced equality 
principles pursuant largely to the Fourteenth Amendment and the dangers it created for civil 
liberties). 
 65. Michael W. McConnell, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 47 (1989). 
 66. Wilson, supra note 5, at 167. Richard Epstein likewise “favors allowing religious 
business owners or actors to act using their own discretion and to absorb the reputational 
stigma that may come from refusing services based on religious beliefs.” Mimi Teixeira, 
Richard Epstein on conflict between anti-discrimination laws and religious freedom, ACTON 
INST. (July 25, 2016), http://blog.acton.org/archives/88222-richard-epstein-on-conflict-
between-anti-discrimination-laws-and-religious-freedom.html.  
 67. See James M. Donovan, Half-Baked: The Demand by For-Profit Businesses for 
Religious Exemptions from Selling to Same-Sex Couples, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39, 51–60 (2016) 
(“asserted right to exclude . . . emerged only as a proxy for slavery so as to maintain 
domination over African Americans after the . . . Civil War”); Singer, supra note 42, at 1294 
(“narrow range of businesses with duties to serve the public under both current common law 
and the 1964 federal statute do not reflect the common law as it has existed from time 
immemorial”).  
 68. William Eskridge wisely notes (while I disagree with his model for this) that religion 
bears a role in “both confronting discriminatory policies endorsed by religions and 
accommodating the faithful where possible.”). Eskridge, supra note 53, at 664. 
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In these opinions, one finds the application of the “non-distinction” 
approach where courts conflate the difference between invidious 
discrimination and refusals to serve the LGBT-community based solely on 
considering the service to be an endorsement of an underlying conduct 
deemed sinful. 
A. Elane Photography 
Among the first legal opinions that tackles the issue of public 
accommodations refusing to serve certain members of the LGBT-
community comes from New Mexico, where the state’s highest court 
examined an alleged violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act 
(“NMHRA”) by the owner of Elane Photography, who refused to 
photograph a commitment ceremony between a lesbian couple. The owner 
of Elane Photography argued that compliance would convey a message of 
endorsement in violation of her religious beliefs against gay marriage.69 The 
court applied the non-distinction approach by equating the owner’s refusal 
to photograph the lesbian couple’s commitment ceremony on par with a 
hypothetical refusal to photograph an interracial couple.70  
In justifying this approach, the court built on the difficulty of 
distinguishing between status and conduct since the conduct at issue is “so 
closely correlated with sexual orientation” that it would severely undermine 
the purpose of the law.71 The court cited in support the Supreme Court’s 
decision in CLS v. Martinez, which likewise “rejected similar attempts 
distinguish between a protected status and conduct closely correlated with 
that status.”72 In short, the conflation between status and conduct was the 
                                                                                                                                      
 69. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58–59, 61 (N.M. 2013). The 
language of the Human Rights Act reads broadly to proscribed any discrimination whether 
or not it was done “directly or indirectly.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(F) (2008). “Elane 
Photography argues that it would have taken portrait photographs and performed other 
services for same-sex customers, so long as they did not request photographs that involved 
or endorsed same-sex weddings.” Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 61. To Elane, in the process 
of creating and editing the photos, she was creating a “positive story about each wedding . . . 
and the company and its owners would prefer not to send a positive message about same-sex 
weddings or same-sex marriage.” Id. at 63. 
 70. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 59. 
 71. Id. at 61. 
 72. Id. (citing Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010)). In CLS, the 
Court referred to Lawrence v. Texas, regarding the criminalization of sodomy as an example 
of conduct closely correlated with being homosexual, and to Bray v. Alexandria Women’s 
Health, providing an illustration where “a tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.” 
Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. at 689 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); 
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product of what the court understood to be an inextricable relationship 
between a person’s public commitment to another person of the same-sex 
and that person’s identity as a homosexual.73  
As a corollary to this non-distinction approach, any free speech defenses 
are colored by the underlying conflation and are, therefore, non-viable. The 
court, in this case, rejected a compelled speech argument despite conceding 
that photography may very well involve an artistic service—even conveying 
the client’s own personal message—but this was irrelevant since the plaintiff 
in Elane Photography chose her line of business.74 If she wanted to escape 
liability under the NMHRA, she could have ceased offering her services to 
the public at large.75 As long as she remained open to the public, she had to 
serve all76 customers. 
B. Arlene’s Flowers 
A second case goes much deeper into understanding the mindset or 
intent factor of business owner’s refusal to serve.  
This case involves Barronelle Stutzman, who (along with her husband) 
owned and operated Arlene’s Flowers—a closely-held, for-profit 
corporation.77 Mrs. Stutzman’s work revolved around creating floral 
arrangement for special occasions, including weddings.78 She considered 
this an artistic service,79 representing her unique talents and creativity.80 She 
                                                                                                                                      
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993)). These reliance verses 
will be dealt with in Section V. 
 73. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 62. 
 74. Id. at 66. 
 75. Id. at 67. 
 76. By “all” the court means all those within a protected category, i.e. “race, sex, sexual 
orientation, or other protected classification.” Id. at 72. The opinion for example said that an 
Africa-American does not have to offer service to members of the KKK because group 
membership is not a protected category—the reverse is not true since race is part of a 
protected category. Id. 
 77. State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 2015 WL 720213, at *3 (Wash. Super. 2015) 
[hereinafter Arlene’s Flowers]. 
 78. Id.  
 79. See Barronelle Stutzman, I’m a florist, but I refused to do flowers for my gay friend’s 
wedding, WASHINGTON POST (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/128/im-a-florist-but-i-
refused-to-do-flowers-for-my-gay-friends-wedding/ [hereinafter Stutzman WAPO]. 
 80. Brief of Appellants at 7, State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, (No. 91615-2), 
2015 WL 720213, at *1 (Wash. Super. 2015) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants]; see also Motion 
for Leave to File Brief and Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellants, at 5–7, State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, (No. 91615-2), 2015 WL 720213, 
at *1 (Wash. Super. 2015) (offering evidence how florists engage in artistic services). 
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had never expressed nor harbored animus toward the gay couple bringing 
this suit against her (Ingersoll and Freed, collectively: “Plaintiffs”), nor any 
other members of the LGBTQ+ community.81 Mrs. Stutzman has served the 
Plaintiffs “on nearly 30 previous occasions and referred them [elsewhere] 
for only one event due to her sincere religious beliefs.”82  
As a Christian, Mrs. Stutzman believes that endorsing or participating83 
in a same-sex wedding goes against the clear teaching of Scripture and she 
believes that lending her artistic talents to such a celebration would amount 
to an act of endorsement.84 While she felt “terrible” that she could not share 
in the Plaintiff’s joy of being married, for her, it was never about the sexual 
orientation of the individual, but about the message she felt she was being 
asked to convey.85 As the Superior Court acknowledged, Mrs. Stutzman was 
simply following the teachings of the Southern Baptist Convention that 
balances the need to uphold a traditional view on marriage while retaining a 
loving attitude towards those who struggle with same-sex attraction.86 Mrs. 
Stutzman offered the names of other florists who she knew would do a good 
job, which cost the Plaintiff’s $7.91 in out-of-pocket expenses.87  
After Mrs. Stutzman refused to provide her services, and after she 
refused to comply with a statement ensuring that her conduct at issue 
would not be repeated, this lawsuit was filed.88 The State of Washington 
                                                                                                                                      
 81. Brief of Appellants, supra note 80, at 9, 32. 
 82. Id. at 2; see also Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *3 (“Stutzman had served [the 
plaintiff] approximately 20 times or more and that he had spent in the range of $4,500 at 
Arlene’s Flowers.”). 
 83. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *3.  
 84. Id. The Superior Court acknowledged that Mrs. Stutzman “draws a distinction 
between the provision of raw materials . . . and the provision of flower arrangements that she 
has herself arranged [for the wedding].” Id. 
 85. Stutzman WAPO, supra note 79.  
 86. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *3. Any forms of “gay-bashing, disrespectful 
attitudes, hateful rhetoric, or hate-incited actions” toward the LGBT community is explicitly 
condemned. Id. at 3 n.7. This sentiment is echoed throughout the Christian community. See, 
e.g., Nick Roen, Homophobia Has No Place in the Church, DESIRING GOD (Mar. 29, 2016), 
http://www.desiringgod.org/articles/homophobia-has-no-place-in-the-church (noting the 
fear that homophobia is all too common inside the church and urges Christians to operate in 
love. RUSSELL MOORE, ONWARD: ENGAGING THE CULTURE WITHOUT LOSING THE GOSPEL 182–
83 (2015) (calling on Christians to love and serve gay and lesbian neighbors and to reject 
those voices that try to intimidate them). 
 87. Stutzman WAPO, supra note 79; Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *4. 
 88. Lornet Turnbull, State’s Case Against Florist Fires Up Gay-Marriage Critics, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/statersquos-case-against-
florist-fires-up-gay-marriage-critics/. The Attorney General did seek, prior to the lawsuit, for 
Mrs. Stutzman to “sign an Assurance of Discontinuance . . . , stipulating that the conduct at 
issue here occurred and would not be repeated.” Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *5. 
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heard about the conflict through the media and the Plaintiffs only joined 
the fray nine days after the State filed its lawsuit.89 The challenge asserted 
that Mrs. Stutzman violated the Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) by 
engaging in “unfair or deceptive act or practice”90 and the Washington Law 
Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) in refusing to accommodate the 
Plaintiffs’ request. Both statutes were read liberally per instruction of the 
state legislature. The former required a lesser showing if the attorney 
general brings charges and the latter allowed for a violation to occur if the 
discrimination was either direct or indirect.91   
In relation to the issue of conflating conduct and identity, Mrs. Stutzman 
argued for the Court to make a distinction between the conduct of the 
Plaintiffs in being married and their identity as homosexual.92 However, the 
Court rejected this attempt by citing to the Supreme Court and asserting 
that “the extent to which religious motivation may provide an affirmative 
defense . . . is irrelevant under both the CPA and WLAD.”93 Looking to Bob 
Jones v. United States, the Superior Court asserted the Supreme Court “has 
long held that discrimination based on conduct associated with a protected 
characteristic constitutes discrimination on the basis of that 
characteristic.”94 Mrs. Stutzman’s refusal to “do the flowers” on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                      
 89. Brief of Appellants, supra note 80, at 13-14; Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *5. 
 90. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *5 (case brought by the Attorney General). 
 91. Id. The relevant language from the statute prohibited discrimination as follows: 
It shall be an unfair practice for any person or the person's agent or employee 
to commit an act which directly or indirectly results in any distinction, 
restriction, or discrimination . . . or the refusing or withholding from any 
person the admission, patronage, custom, presence, frequenting, dwelling, 
staying, or lodging in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, 
or amusement, except for conditions and limitations established by law and 
applicable to all persons, regardless of race, creed, color, national origin, sexual 
orientation . . . . 
RCW § 49.60.215(1) (West 2011). Interestingly, Mrs. Stutzman tried to argue that the lawsuit 
was moot and that its momentum was largely due to a misunderstanding. Arlene's Flowers, 
2015 WL 720213, at *9. According to Mrs. Stutzman, had she known that all the Plaintiffs 
wanted was raw materials, instead of flower arrangements, for the wedding, she of gladly 
complied. Id. The Court was not persuaded. Id. at *13. 
 92. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *13. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at *15 (citing Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983)). 
The court also cited Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. at 689 (2010) as another instance where 
the Supreme Court refused to distinguish between status and conduct in the context of a 
university student group rejecting gay members. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *16. 
The Court asserted that there existed no authority for the “proposition that substantial 
compliance with discrimination laws excuses any individual act of discrimination.” Id. 
(citing Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 62 (N.M. 2013)). 
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her religious opposition to same sex marriage, was for the Court—as a 
matter of law—a refusal based on the sexual orientation of the couple.95 
This conflation was made easy given that the language of the WLAD 
explicitly disallowed making “any distinction, restriction, or 
discrimination” based on a protected class.96  
On the free speech issue in response to the non-distinction approach, the 
Court refused to acknowledge that any persuasive authority existed to 
justify an exemption from the state’s antidiscrimination provision.97 The 
justification was clear. Since the Supreme Court forbids racial 
discrimination in employment, and since the Court in Rumsfeld v. FAIR 
made clear that the “abridgment of freedom of speech” cannot be made a 
reason to disallow the illegality of certain conduct simply because that 
conduct was “initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,” 
Mrs. Stutzman’s appeal to the Frist Amendment was untenable.98 
The Washington Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the court of 
appeals, continuing to base its decision largely on the non-distinction 
approach on the constitutional issue.99 The Court noted that numerous 
courts have rejected the status/conduct distinction, pointing out that the 
decision in Obergefell made clear that “the denial of marriage equality to 
same-sex couples [was] itself [akin] to discrimination.”100 On the question 
of compelled speech, the Court refused to acknowledge that Mrs. Stutzman, 
                                                                                                                                      
 95. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *15. 
 96. Id. at *15 n.18 (citing RCW 49.60.215(1) (West 2011)). As a matter of what appears 
to be pure formalism, the Court determined that since Mrs. Stutzman admitted to the 
underlying “conduct that constitutes a violation of the statute,” and since the Court refused 
to make any distinctions proposed by Mrs. Stutzman in order to assert First Amendment 
defense, nothing remained to remove her conduct from the statutes intended purpose. 
Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *16. It seemed that even if the Court allowed an inquiry 
framed in terms of making the necessary distinction between conduct and identity, the 
language of the statute in disallowing indirect discriminatory results would still require the 
same outcome. Id. at *18. 
 97. Id. at *20 (citing Elane Photography, 309 P. 3d at 72)). 
 98. Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 
62 (2006)). The Court likewise struck down a freedom of association defense by citing 
Supreme Court precedent that removes “[i]nvidious private discrimination” from 
constitutional protection. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *22 (quoting Hishon v. King 
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)). 
 99. State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 553, 568 (Wash. 2017). 
The court agreed that if the state statute violated constitutional rights, the latter would 
prevail. Id. at 556. 
 100. Id. at 553. 
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by providing flowers for the wedding, bore the markings of an “inherent[] 
expressi[on]” that viewers would understand without further explanation.101  
C. Sweetcakes by Melissa 
The same non-distinction approach was present when the Commissioner 
of the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (“BOLI”), Brad Avakian, 
upheld a $135,000 fine on the Klein Family for refusing to sell a cake to a 
lesbian couple.102 The facts are largely the same as in the previous two cases. 
Here, the gay couple, anticipating a same-sex ceremony, sought out the 
services of the Klein Family to make a wedding cake.103 After the Kleins 
discovered that the cake was intended for a same-sex ceremony, they 
declined to complete the request, citing to their religious convictions.104 
Afterward, a complaint was filed with the Oregon Department of Justice, 
where the Kleins were accused of calling the gay couple an “abomination[] 
unto the lord” and allegedly claiming that the couple’s money was “not 
equal.”105 Several months later, a complaint was filed with BOLI alleging 
that Sweetcakes by Melissa had discriminated against the couple on the 
basis of their sexual orientation. 
The violation itself involved not simply the refusal to sell, but also a 
communicated intent to discriminate in the future based on sexual 
orientation.106 As the Commissioner found, the interviews and the note left 
                                                                                                                                      
 101. Id. at 557. As the court pointed out: “The decision to either provide or reuse to 
provide flowers for a wedding does not inherently express a message about that wedding.” 
Id. 
 102. Melissa Elaine Klein, 34 BOLI 102 (2015), 2015 WL 4868796, at *23, available at 
http://www.oregon.gov/boli/SiteAssets/pages/press/Sweet%20Cakes%20FO.pdf [hereinafter 
BOLI FINAL ORDER]. 
 103. Id. at *3. 
 104. Id. When the Kleins refused to complete the order, only one of the lesbians was 
present. During this exchange, the record indicates that the Kleins had cited to Leviticus 
18:22 (i.e., “you shall not lie with a male as one lies with a female; it is an abomination”) 
among the reasons why they could not comply with the request. Id. Upon hearing this, one 
of the lesbians felt that the denial of service signified that she was a “creature not created by 
God, not created with a soul” and that she was “unworthy of holy love . . . [and] not worthy 
of life.” Id. at *4. 
 105. Melissa Elaine Klein, 34 BOLI 102 (2015), 2015 WL 4868796, at *6. 
 106. Id. at *16. The statute made it an unlawful practice to “publish, circulate, issue or 
display . . . any communication, notice, advertisement or sign” that signified any intent to 
discriminate against any person based on their sexual orientation. Id. at *14 (citing ORS § 
659A.409 (West 2016)). Note that the Commissioner struck down a constitutional challenge 
to ORS § 659A.409 as a speech code, alleging that it only applies “to the business of a place of 
public accommodation” and not to an individual’s “personal opinion, political commentary, 
or other privileged communication.” Id. at *18. Whether this means that no public 
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outside the Sweetcakes business constituted a “clear intent to discriminate 
in the future just as they had done [in the past].”107 Further, looking to the 
antidiscrimination public accommodation laws, the Commissioner, 
developing the laws origins as an effort to rid the public of racial 
discrimination, framed this “case . . . not [being] about a wedding cake or a 
marriage . . . [but] about a business’s refusal to serve someone because of 
their sexual orientation.”108 The Commissioner went on by stating that the 
forum has already denied any distinction between denying service on the 
basis of sexual orientation and on the basis of not wishing to participate in a 
same-sex wedding.109 Furthermore, the Commissioner went on to indict the 
Kleins for their “clear and direct statement” that the lesbian couple “lacked 
an identity worthy of being recognized . . . . [an act that] devalues the 
humanity of us all.”110 The Kleins were fined $135,000—not to punish them, 
but to make the lesbian couple whole.111 This case is currently on appeal to 
the Oregon Supreme Court.112  
                                                                                                                                      
accommodation can ever convey an expressive service thus enjoying the protections of the 
First Amendment is uncertain.  
 107. Id. at *16. 
 108. Melissa Elaine Klein, 34 BOLI 102 (2015), 2015 WL 4868796, at *19.  
 109. Id. The reason provided in the Appendix quotes the same sections from CLS v. 
Martinez and Elane Photography, refusing to make any distinctions and stating that a 
marriage ceremony is inextricably connected to a person’s sexual orientation. Id. at *52.  
 110. Id. at *19.  
 111. Melissa Elaine Klein, 34 BOLI 102 (2015), 2015 WL 4868796, at *23-4. The 
Commissioner seemed to have arrived at these figures based on the “extent and severity” of 
the emotional suffering exhibited by the lesbian couple. Id. at *23. Despite the better 
judgment of Judge Kethledge, to me, this case is based on “ridiculous” arguments. See 
Bennett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 584, 584 (6th Cir. 2013). As Andrew 
Koppelman rightly pointed out, “the Oregon Labor Commissioner's finding of liability and 
the extraordinarily large damage award were crafted with no evident awareness that there 
was any free speech issue” and shows how local decision makers can abuse their position. 
Koppelman, supra note 21, at 1155–56, 1159. Perhaps the Oregon Commissioner could be 
among the rare examples sought out by Peter J. Smith of those judges drive entirely by 
ignorance. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1481 (2007). With Brad 
Avakian’s record and affiliation with gay rights advocacy groups during the case 
deliberation, it perhaps time for him to heed the advice of Judge Posner and admit that his 
decision was politically driven. Id. at 1482 n.233 (“Posner . . . has argued that that judges 
should stop deluding themselves into believing that they do not act politically . . . .”); Kelsey 
Harkness, Emails Raise Questions of Bias in Case Against Bakers Who Denied Services for 
Same-Sex Wedding, Daily Signal (June 1, 2015), http://dailysignal.com/2015/06/01/emails-
raise-questions-of-bias-in-case-against-bakers-who-denied-service-for-same-sex-wedding/; 
Adam Andrzejewski, Brad Avakian’s Political Hacking of the Oregon Bureau of Labor and 
Industry, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamandrzejewski/2016/10/24/brad-avakians-political-
hacking-of-the-oregon-bureau-of-labor-and-industry/#150366f11935; see also Richard A. 
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D. Masterpiece Bakery 
In another similar case, this one out of Colorado, the state court of 
appeals upheld the Colorado Civil Rights Commission ruling in favor of a 
gay couple who was denied their request for Masterpiece Cakeshop to 
“design and create a [wedding] cake to celebrate their same-sex wedding.”113 
According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the owner, Jack C. 
Phillips, could not comply with this request because he believed that 
“decorating cakes is a form of art . . . and that he would displease God by 
[acquiescing].”114 The couple filed charges of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”).115 The 
ALJ found in favor of the couple, and ordered a “cease and desist” requiring 
Masterpiece to take remedial measures to ensure compliance with the 
CADA and to file quarterly reports for two years indicating what measures 
were taken in compliance and if any other patrons were denied service.116 
Interestingly, this decision came even after the ALJ acknowledged that 
creating a wedding cake required “considerable skill and artistry;” however, 
the “finished product” did not constitute protected speech under the First 
Amendment.117  
                                                                                                                                      
Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 865 (1988) (“By pulling the 
wool over the public's eyes, the pretense of certitude and neutrality may strengthen the 
political position of the courts in our society, and maybe that is a good thing—or maybe 
not.”).  
 112. Maxine Bernstein, Owners of Sweet Cakes file appeal with Oregon Supreme Court, 
THE OREGONIAN (March. 2, 2018), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2018/03/owners_of_sweet_cakes_file_app.ht
ml. The Oregon Court of Appeals tracked closely the common language used for the non-
distinction approach. See Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus., 289 Or. App. 507, 523, 
410 P.3d 1051, 1063 (2017) (“The Kleins refused to make a wedding cake for the 
complainants precisely and expressly because of the relationship between sexual orientation 
and the conduct at issue (a wedding). And, where a close relationship between status and 
conduct exists, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the type of distinction urged by 
the Kleins.”). 
 113. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015). 
 114. Id. at 277. 
 115. Id. The law was read broadly to prohibit any “direct[] or indirect[]” discrimination 
in the public accommodation setting. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (West 
2014). 
 116. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 277. 
 117. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at *7-8 (Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm'n Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/MasterpieceDecision.pdf, aff'd, No. 
CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n May 30, 2014), 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/MasterpieceFinalAgencyOrder.pdf, aff'd, 2015 COA 115 
(Colo. App. Aug. 13, 2015). 
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The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the ALJ—and, in 
doing so, applied the non-distinction approach adopted in the prior three 
cases. The court correctly pointed out that the issue with designing the cake 
for Jack Phillips was an issue with the celebratory message conveyed in 
baking a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.118 It was never about the 
individual’s sexual orientation, and in fact, Jack Phillips readily agreed to 
sell them any other bakery product.119 In response, the Court of Appeals, 
like the previous three decisions, cited the same language from Martinez, 
Lawrence, and Bob Jones—as well as citing to the recent same-sex marriage 
decision in Obergefell for the proposition that the “Supreme Court equated 
laws precluding same-sex marriage to discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.”120 In essence, certain same-sex conduct is so “closely 
correlated” with the underlying sexual orientation status that to deny one is 
to deny the other.121 This was based on the fact that “the act of same-sex 
marriage constitutes such conduct because it is ‘engaged in exclusively or 
predominately’ by gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.”122  
Finally, the Court also dismissed the compelled speech123 argument, 
contending (like the Supreme Court in Arlene’s Flowers) that the public 
would not associate the selling of goods with an endorsement of same-sex 
marriage.124 While this may be true, it is more likely a failure to 
acknowledge the broader culture125 and the ability of certain acts to be 
                                                                                                                                      
 118. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 280. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 280–281 (citing in support Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2016)). 
 121. Id. at 281. 
 122. Id. The Court made this leap by allowing the presumption from Bray, which 
declared that: although opposition to voluntary abortion does not equate to a discrimination 
against woman, “[s]ome activities may be such an irrational object of disfavor that, if they are 
targeted, and if they also happen to be engaged in exclusively or predominately by a 
particular class of people, an intent to disfavor that class can readily be presumed.” Id. at 282 
(citing Bray, 506 U.S. at 270) (emphasis added). The court offers the example that a “tax on 
wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.” Bray, 506 U.S. at 270. Under this logic, it is hard to 
explain how opposition to abortion does not “discriminate” against women since women are 
clearly the particular class who engages “exclusively or predominately” in that conduct. 
What seems to be happening is that the court is willing to recognize an ideological agenda 
when it comes to opposing abortion (instead of it being solely based on sexism), but refuses 
to extend this logic in instances involving the LGBT-community. 
 123. See id. at 288 (“order requiring Masterpiece not to discriminate against potential 
customers because of their sexual orientation does not force it to engage in compelled 
expressive conduct”). 
 124. Id. at 287. 
 125. Clashes involving the LGBT and religious community have become widely 
publicized. See, e.g., Ahiza Garcia, Georgia, N.C. and beyond: What you need to know about 
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imbued with expressive association.126 Justice Thurgood Marshall explained 
this well when he illustrated that the act of sleeping and sitting—although 
typically non-expressive—can become a “novel mode of communication” if 
done in a given context.127 In the current American culture, the freedom of 
association has provided a vehicle for public figures like Bruce 
Springsteen,128 Bryan Adams, 129 Tracy Morgan,130 and others131 to stand 
together against perceived discrimination toward the LGBTQ+ 
community.132 On the other hand, small businesses that refused to cater 
                                                                                                                                      
the clash over 'anti-gay' bills, CNN MONEY (Mar. 26, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/26/news/anti-lgbt-bills-north-carolina-georgia/; Zack Ford, 
Indiana And South Dakota Kick Off Backlash Against LGBT Rights, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 28, 
2016), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2016/01/28/3743668/indiana-south-dakota-
discrimination-bills/. 
 126. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 304-05 (1984) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 306; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 139 (1966). Cf. Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Speech of Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 241, 265–74 
(2015) (discusses that context can create expressive meaning); Dale Carpenter, Expressive 
Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 1515, 1556 (2001) (under a message-based approach, with the backdrop of “loud, 
continuous, and insistent demands to discuss and take sides on gay-rights claims, a steadfast 
refusal to talk at all about the issue is hardly neutral.”).  
 128. Ben Sisario, Bruce Springsteen Cancels North Carolina Concert Over Bias Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/09/business/media/bruce-
springsteen-cancels-a-north-carolina-concert-over-anti-gay-law.html?_r=0. 
 129. Nigel M. Smith, Bryan Adams Cancels Mississippi Tour Date in Protest Over Anti-
LGBT Law, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2016), 
http://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/apr/11/bryan-adams-cancels-mississippi-tour-
date-protest-of-anti-lgbt-law. 
 130. Brittany Spanos, Tracy Morgan Cancels Mississippi Performance Over Religious 
Accommodations Act, ROLLING STONES (Apr. 19, 2016), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/tracy-morgan-cancels-mississippi-performance-
20160419. 
 131. Daniel Nussbaum, 30 Hollywood Power Players Join George Boycott Over Religious 
Freedom Bill, BREITBART (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/big-
hollywood/2016/03/24/lee-daniels-anne-hathaway-rob-reiner-and-more-join-georgia-
boycott-over-religious-freedom-bill/. 
 132. Recently the National Basketball Association (NBA) decided to move the All-Star 
game from Charlotte in protest to the State’s bathroom laws deemed discriminatory towards 
the transgendered public. Scott Cacciola, N.B.A. to Move All-Star Game From North 
Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/sports/basketball/nba-all-star-game-moves-charlotte-
transgender-bathroom-law.html. 
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same-sex weddings are often associated with the message of the “religious 
right,”133 and branded as being “bigots”134 for their alleged discrimination.  
For those reasons, the dissenting members in the case were correct in 
wanting to grant the appeal to determine whether the CADA required Jack 
Phillips to violate his rights under the First Amendment—an issue shortly 
to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.135  
E. Outliers 
Interestingly, the Colorado Court of Appeals did admit that a wedding 
cake could have a particularized message sufficient to trigger First 
                                                                                                                                      
 133. See Leslie Dorrough Smith, Beyond Religious Right and Secular Left Rhetoric: The 
Road to Compromise, J. OF CHURCH & STATE 57.4, at 801–03 (2015). 
 134. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 17; Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on 
the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 260, 267–69 (2010); see also 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (holding opposing views can be “based on 
decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises”). As rightly noted by Professor 
Carol A. Ball of Rutgers, it is false to label unequivocally “all business owners who refuse on 
religious grounds to provide goods and services to same-sex couples [as bigots],” especially if 
that owner (like Barronelle Stutzman) is otherwise willing to serve the gay couple in a 
different context (i.e. request). Ball, supra note 17, at 644. In the Oral Argument before the 
Supreme Court, the lawyer for the Petitioner advocating to legalize same-sex marriage failed 
to answer the question as to whether everyone who held to traditional views on marriage 
intended to “demean gay people” as the Michigan law holding to traditional marriage 
allegedly did. The exchange is memorable for its probing qualities—if not for the Plaintiff’s 
famous “times can blind” response likely lifted from Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence v. Texas 
majority. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-17, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (No. 14-556), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ 
14-556q1_l5gm.pdf; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (“[T]hose who drew 
and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that 
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”); see also Obergefell, 
135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Robert, J., dissenting) (“[T]o blind yourself to history is both prideful and 
unwise.”). Again, from Professor Ball: “In theory, it is possible to defend a traditional 
understanding of marriage without making moral judgments regarding characteristics, 
attributes, and values of same-sex relationships.” Ball, supra note 17, at 654. I suspect that for 
many Christians, rejecting homosexual conduct is inextricably connected with moral 
judgment—not as to the actor, however, but certainly as to the act—this much Professor Ball 
acknowledged throughout her article. See id. at 655, 660; see also Matthew J. Franck, 
Introduction to RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS 1–6 (Timothy S. Shah, Thomas F. Farr, 
Jack Friedman eds. 2016) (discussing the conception of sexual ethics as part of Christian 
humanism). 
 135. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, No. 15SC738, 2016 
WL 1645027, at *1 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016). The significance of the Supreme Court’s pending 
decision cannot be overstated in the wider ramifications it has on related faith/equality 
issues. See generally Anton Sorkin, A Starch Reality 7(1) OXFORD J. OF L. & RELIGION (2018). 
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Amendment speech protections.136 An example of this took place the year 
before Masterpiece Cakeshop when the Colorado Department of Regulatory 
Agencies upheld the right of baker to refuse to design a cake that contained 
content disparaging same-sex marriage.137 This case involved a customer 
who requested that Azucar Bakery (specifically, the Pastry Chef Lindsay 
Jones) design two cakes, one depicting a gay couple holding hands with a 
red “X” marked over the image and the other including various Bible verses 
about God’s hate for sin and forgiveness of sinners.138 The Bakery refused to 
comply because it viewed the “verses as discriminatory” and maintaining 
that all requests deemed “offensive” or “hateful” would be refused, 
regardless of religion.139  
The decision turned on a four-element test for discriminatory denial of 
equal treatment, the customer having met the first three,140 but failed the 
fourth, which stated that “the Charging Party was treated differently by the 
Respondent than other individuals not of his/her protected class.”141 The 
Colorado Department acknowledged that the Respondent’s denial was 
based on the explicit message that the customer wished to include and the 
seller’s concern that the message was discriminatory.142 While the customer 
alleged that he was treated differently than non-Christians, the Department 
found no evidence supporting this conclusion.143 In short, the Department 
asserted that as long as the Bakery refuses all similar requests without 
reference to the customer’s status (i.e., protected class),144 it is not violating 
the state’s antidiscrimination laws. Lest we consider this an aberration, the 
                                                                                                                                      
 136. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 288 (Colo. App. 2015). 
 137. Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 24, 
2015) [hereinafter “Azucar Bakery”], available at 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/AzucarDecision.pdf. The Azucar Bakery decision was marked 
to be “[o]n behalf of the Colorado Civil Rights Division,” which was the same agency that 
ruled against Masterpiece Bakery. Id. at 5; Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 276. 
 138. Azucar Bakery, supra note 137, at 2. Among the verses include: “God hates sin,” 
“Homosexuality is a detestable sin,” and “While we were yet sinners Christ died for us.” Id. 
 139. Id. at 1-2. 
 140. Namely: (1) the Charging Party is a member of a protected class; (2) the Charging 
Party sought the goods and services of the Respondent; (3) the Charging Party is otherwise a 
qualified recipient of the goods and services of the Respondent. Id. at 3-4. 
 141. Id. at 4. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. The Department noted that “[u]nlawful discrimination” is primarily based on a 
person’s “asserted protected group or status.” Id. at 2. Further, the stated reason for denying 
a request is a rebuttable presumption—evidence of pretext may be offered to show denial 
was solely on the basis of that persons protected status. Id. 
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Colorado Commission ruled likewise in two other cases brought by the 
same charging party.145 
In another outlier, the Kentucky Circuit Court reversed the decision 
adopted by the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights 
Commission (“Commission”), which held that Hands On Original 
(“HOO”) discriminated against the Gay and Lesbian Services Organization 
(“GLSO”) in violation of the “Fairness Ordinance” when it refused to print 
the official t-shirt for GLSO’s 2012 Pride Festival.146 As part of HOO’s 
policy, any service that went to “endorse positions that conflict with the 
convictions of the ownership” would be refused.147 Based on this policy, 
HOO has denied at least thirteen orders over the past several years, 
believing the designs to be “offensive contrary to their Christian beliefs or 
otherwise inappropriate.”148 
The Circuit Court found that in forcing HOO to print the shirts, the 
Commissioner, as an agent of the government, compelled the printing 
company to speak a message that it was constitutionally protected from 
speaking.149 Where GLSO and the Commissioner intended to frame the 
issue that HOO denied the request based on the sexual orientation of 
GLSO’s members,150 the Court found that the real issue rests on the message 
                                                                                                                                      
 145. See Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 24, 
2015), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/GateauxDecision.pdf; Jack v. Le Bakery 
Sensual, Charge No. P20140070X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 24, 2015), available at 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/LeBakerySensualDecision.pdf. 
 146. Hands On Originals, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights 
Comm’n, Civil Action No. 14-CI-04474, at 2 (Circuit Court Third Division, April 27, 2015), 
available at 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HandsOnOriginalsDecision.pdf. 
 147. Id. at 3. The understood endorsement in this case would be “that people should take 
pride in sexual relationships or sexual activity outside of a marriage between a man and a 
woman.” Id. at 6. 
 148. Id. at 3. 
 149. Id. at 9. 
 150. Lexington-Fayette County Human Rights Commission v. Hands On Originals, Inc., 
HRC No. 03-12-3135 at 12, 16 (Oct. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HOOrecommendation.pdf. The confusion was whether HOO 
refused to print the t-shirt because it didn't want to advocate pride in “being homosexual” or 
because it didn't want to advocate pride in “sexual activity outside of a marriage between one 
man and one woman.” Id. at 12; Hands on Originals, No. 14-CI-04474, at 9. The distinction 
between rejecting the same-sex marriage versus the practice of sex outside of marriage is 
significant because it allows Christian businesses to separate themselves from opposing 
conduct “exclusively or predominantly” engaged in by a protected class, which most courts 
find problematic, even in cases where the Christian owners win. See, e.g., Lexington Fayette 
Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm'n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., No. 2015-CA-000745-MR, 
2017 WL 2211381, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017). 
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that GLSO intended to inscribe on the shirts, which went against HOO’s 
sincerely held Christian beliefs.151 Where the Commissioner rejected a claim 
that the Fairness Ordinance violates HOO’s First Amendment guarantees, 
the Circuit Court, by avoiding the non-distinction approach, was able to 
clearly differentiate the absence of evidence of sexual orientation 
discrimination based on status and see that the real issue is centered around 
the compelled message and forced association elements in violation of 
Supreme Court precedent.152 If the Commissioner wants to infringe on 
these First Amendment protections, it must offer a compelling reason to do 
so.153  
While these cases illustrate the opposing approaches in relatively similar 
fact scenarios, this Article turns next to arguing that the non-distinction 
approach is a legal fiction used to advance the interest of the court toward 
some societal norm.  
IV.  LEGAL FICTIONS 
Defining the concept of legal fictions is difficult for many reasons.154 
Among those being that the classic formulation does not provide a 
consensus approach155 and the so-called “new legal fiction” is surrounded 
by a seeming obliviousness of its use156 or is at least marked by a profound 
                                                                                                                                      
 151. Hands on Originals, No. 14-CI-04474 at 10. The Court emphasized that the sexual 
orientation of GLSO’s representatives who contacted HOO was never disclosed and that the 
real issue was what the actual group endorsed through the Pride Festival. Id.  
 152. Id. at 10-13. 
 153. Id. at 15. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, connecting the 
rejection to print t-shirts celebrating a certain choice of lifestyle, amounts to “viewpoint or 
message censorship,” which the fairness ordinance allows. Lexington Fayette Urban Cty. 
Human Rights Comm'n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., No. 2015-CA-000745-MR, 2017 WL 
2211381, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017). In a more recent decision, the Superior Court of 
California sided with a couple’s refusal to create a wedding cake to be used in celebration of a 
same sex marriage. See Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Cathy’s Creations, 
No. BCV-17-102855 (Cal. Super. Ct., Feb. 05, 2018), available at 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4368433/Tastries-Ruling.pdf. The Court’s 
holding rested on a refusal to pin the State’s interest in ensuring a freely accessible 
marketplace above the First Amendment: “A wedding cake is not just a cake in a Free Speech 
analysis. It is an artistic expression by the person making it that is to be used traditionally as 
a centerpiece in the celebration of a marriage. There could not be a greater form of 
expressive conduct.” Id. at *1, *4.   
 154. Douglas Lind, The Pragmatic Value of Legal Fictions, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 83, 85 (2015); LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 5 (1967). 
 155. See Smith, supra note 111, at 1465. 
 156. See id. at 1472 (“Sometimes judges rely on new legal fictions simply because they 
believe them to be true.”). With “new legal fictions . . . there generally is no recognition of the 
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lack of transparency.157 Other problems, more closely aligned with the 
nature of the non-distinction approach, is the use of fictions as an 
instrument for a judge to push for their own normative choices in 
fashioning legal rules.158 In these instances, it makes sense why a judge 
would want to avoid the appearance of using legal fictions instead of 
established precedent.159   
One of the more likely reasons why judges may turn to using legal 
fictions in the cases above is the fear, expressed by the ACLU in Arlene’s 
Flowers, involving a breakdown of antidiscrimination laws as a result of 
accommodating religious claimants.160 This tracks close to what Professor J. 
Smith refers to as the “legitimating function,” where the abandonment of 
fictions could have “de-legitimating consequences.”161 This Section will 
build on the various forms of fictions throughout history while arguing the 
non-distinction approach falls comfortably among these uses; in particular, 
the three forms discussed in Section B. 
                                                                                                                                      
fact that the premise is false, although the assertions need not consciously be intended to 
deceive.” Id. at 1470. 
 157. Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 19 
(2010) (“[E]ither they are not acknowledged to be false or . . . they are not in fact 
demonstrably false.”); Smith, supra note 111, at 1440 (a classic formulation of fictions did 
not intend to deceive while new legal fictions involve a lack of candor). 
 158. See Smith, supra note 111, at 1441. 
 159. See JOHN BAKER, THE LAW’S TWO BODIES 33, 35, 37 (2001) (stating that the “essence 
of a fiction that it leaves no explicit evidence of its existence”) [hereinafter “TWO BODIES”]. 
“[J]udges have actually held it a positive virtue to change the law by stealth.” Id. at 37; see also 
Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE L. J. 147, 148–49 (1917) (stating that the “second 
reason for the use of fiction . . . to conceal the fact that the judges, by their decisions, are 
making or changing the substantive law.”); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 25 
(Montagu ed., 1986) (defines legal fictions “to signify any assumption which conceals, or 
affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration[s] . . . .”); Smith, supra 
note 111, at 1437 (stating that “judges routinely relied on legal fictions to mask the effects of 
legal change.”). 
 160. Brief of Respondents Ingersoll and Freed in Answer to Amicus Curiae Briefs, State of 
Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers No. 91615-2, at 12 (2016) (stating that the there is “no 
limiting principle that would prevent the kind of exemption sought here from swallowing 
the rule”), available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A08/916152%20Resp. 
%20Answer%20to%20Amicus.pdf.  
 161. Smith, supra note 111, at 1478. The purpose behind using fictions in this way is to 
“produce legal rules with positive expressive value[s].” Id. at 1478 (emphasis added). 
Ironically, while judges refuse to acknowledge the artistic expression in the above-mentioned 
services, at the same time, they are using legal fictions as an instrument to advance their own 
expressive positive values as part of the social transformation motif. See id. at 1480 (“If 
nothing else, judges’ factual assumptions often reflect their aspirations for society and the 
law.”). 
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A. History 
In attempting to define legal fictions, the starting point would have to be 
in describing them as statements made in contrast with known or 
discoverable facts.162 Throughout history, famed jurists and common law 
lawyers invoked and renounced legal fictions for a multiplicity of reasons. 
Eminent jurist Lon Fuller has described their use as a source of shame to the 
law, while—at the same time—an indispensable part of its development.163 
Sir Henry Maine echoed these sentiments, writing that the use of fictions 
had a great purpose during the “infancy of society” to overcome the rigidity 
of the law—but as society and law progressed, their usefulness decreased.164 
Others have gone so far as to claim that “at bottom all law is reduced to a 
series of fictions heaped upon another in successive layers.”165 Those who 
support their use wisely point to those benefits that allow for judges to make 
legal assumptions for the purpose of advancing justice when the law may 
otherwise inflict some injury.166  
This idea of creating positive change despite the need for a little sleight of 
hand is a constant theme in the succeeding sections. While this Article takes 
no categorical positions on the use of fictions, it does suggest its present 
usage involving the cases in Section II to be ill advised. Before we get there, 
it will be helpful to briefly trace the use of these “pampered children of the 
law”167 throughout history to supplement any attempts at a definition. 
1. Roman Law 
The concept of legal fictions is an ancient instrument going back to the 
days of the Roman Empire.168 During this time, fictions were used as forms 
of pleadings, signifying a hurdle insurmountable for the defense.169 One 
                                                                                                                                      
 162. Id. at 1437. 
 163. Fuller, supra note 154, at 2. 
 164. MAINE, supra note 159, at 25. He notes in the context of the early “fiction of 
adoption” that it would have been difficult to imagine “how society would ever have escaped 
from its swaddling-clothes, and taken its first step towards civilization.” Id. at 26. “I cannot 
admit any anomaly to be innocent, which makes the law either more difficult to understand 
or harder to arrange in harmonious order.” Id. at 26. 
 165. PIERRE DE TOURTOULON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 387 (1922). 
 166. Sidney T. Miller, The Reasons for Some Legal Fictions, 8 MICHIGAN L. REV. 623 
(1910). 
 167. Legal Fictions, SPECTATOR, Aug. 1888, page 11, available at 
http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/25th-august-1888/11/legal-fictions.  
 168. See Clifford Ando, Fact, Fiction, and Social Reality in Roman Law, in LEGAL 
FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 295–323 (2015); Knauer, supra note 157, at 2 (used by a 
praetor “in order to extend a right of action beyond its intended scope.”).  
 169. See MAINE, supra note 159, at 24–25.  
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common example included asserting that one is a Roman citizen to gain an 
advantage in court, when one was really a foreigner.170  
Another less prosaic example involved a practice at the cult of Jupiter 
where procedural shortcuts existed allowing items ordinarily made sacred 
(therefore property of the gods) to undergo “desacralization” by the mere 
language of written fictions.171 This type of fiction created by authoritarian 
pronouncements can be seen in the writings of Livy when he describes the 
aftermath of a failed battle of Lake Trasimene during the Second Punic 
War.172 In an effort to appease the gods, Rome instated a sacrifice involving 
“an offering of all the young of animals to be born in spring.”173 The 
language, indicative of the type of fictions decreed by will, read: “Do you 
will and so order that these things be done in the manner following? . . . Let 
him who shall make a sacrifice do so at such time and by such rite as shall 
seem good to him; in what manner soever he does it, let it be accounted 
duly done.”174  
While many of the fictions in Roman law possessed a quality of 
authoritative pronouncements contradicting known realities, others 
according to Sir Henry Main were used for the purpose of granting 
                                                                                                                                      
 170. See Simon Stern, Legal Fictions and Exclusionary Rules, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 158 (2015). 
 171. Ando, supra note 168, at 307. Items received as “gi[ft], donation or dedication” were 
able to circumvent the requirement by the mere language in the clause (“let it be profane”) 
after it was used or sold as if it underwent the requisite desacralization. Id. This power to 
create new legal facts through an authorities’ utterance in classical antiquity was evidenced 
by a number of recitations in Arthur Darby Nock’s chapter on Roman religion. Id. at 307–08; 
Arthur Darby Nock, A Feature of Roman Religion, in ROMAN RELIGION 84–96 (Ando ed., 
2003). 
 172. Patrick Hunt, Battle of Trasimene, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 17, 2015), 
 https://www.britannica.com/topic/Battle-of-Trasimene.  
 173. Nock, supra note 171, at 84. 
 174. TITUS LIVIUS (Livy), HISTORY OF ROME 22.10.1-3 (Foster, ed. 1919), available at  
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0152%3Abook%3
D22%3Achapter%3D10 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Livy]. Livy goes on: 
If the animal which he ought to sacrifice dies, let it be deemed unconsecrated 
and let no guilt attach to him; if any shall hurt it or slay it unawares, let it be no 
sin; if any shall steal it, let no guilt attach to the People nor to him from whom 
it shall have been stolen; if he shall sacrifice unwittingly on a black day, let the 
sacrifice be deemed to have been duly made; by night or by day, if slave or 
freeman perform the sacrifice, let it be deemed to have been duly made; if 
sacrifice shall be performed before the senate and the People shall have ordered 
it to be performed, let the People be absolved therefrom and free of obligation. 
22 LIVY, HISTORY OF ROME 10.5-7 (Foster, ed. 1919), available at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0152%3Abook
%3D22%3Achapter%3D10#note4.  
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jurisdiction.175 These latter uses provides a natural shift into the common 
law where, for example, Courts like the Queen’s Bench and Exchequer 
“contrived to usurp the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas” by asserting that 
the “defendant was in custody of the king’s marshal, or that the plaintiff was 
the king’s debtor.”176  
2. Common Law 
At common law, the use of legal fictions became much more prevalent—
some would even say a more “brutal”177 practice—allowing for existing 
developments to give way to novel purposes.178 An important process called 
“exploratory fictions” became an instrument that allowed for common law 
judges to grope around the law for useful principles—a practice often 
recognized as the very “spirit of the common law.”179 Through this process, 
various procedural advantages were developed,180 opportunities for cases to 
be heard by jury were created,181 as well as establishing increasingly 
                                                                                                                                      
 175. MAINE, supra note 159, at 25. Maine explains the jurisdiction use:  
Fictio, in old Roman law, is properly a term of pleading, and signifies a false 
averment on the part of the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to 
traverse; such, for example, as an averment that the plaintiff was a Roman 
citizen when in truth he was a foreigner. 
Id. at 24–25. 
 176. Id.; Miller, supra note 166, at 628–29.  
 177. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 31–32 (1921). 
 178. Michael Lobban, Legal Fictions before the Age of Reform, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 199–201 (2015). 
 179. Maksymilian Del Mar, Legal Fictions and Legal Change in the Common Law 
Tradition, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 235 (2015). William Blackstone, for 
example, noted the use of fictions can be highly beneficial as an end. See 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 43 (Lewis ed., 1897) (“[I]ts proper 
operation being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might result from 
the general rule of law”); Knauer, supra note 157, at 14 (quoting Blackstone in applauding 
the use of fictions as an end, but not the means). Roscoe Pound described how fictions 
served a process of molding the law without legislative action and meeting the immediate 
needs of parties as they arise. Roscoe Pound, Sources, Forms, Modes of Growth, in 3 
JURISPRUDENCE 465 (West Publishing Co. 1959). 
 180. One example was the creation of an action called indebitatus assumpsit, which 
allowed for the Plaintiff to assert, without a showing of evidence, that a promise had been 
made to repay (“being so indebted, he undertook”) a debt by virtue of the debt’s existence. 
Lobban, supra note 178, at 202; J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 
343, 347–48 (2002); DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 157 (2004). 
 181. One example was fictitiously using the action of assumpsit to “raise questions on a 
feigned issue or wager” that would then be submitted to a jury for determination. Lobban, 
supra note 178, at 203 (stating that the “device was used by courts (notably the Chancery) to 
allow disputed matters to be tried by jury at the assizes.”). 
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convenient ways to transfer property—often times done with the purpose of 
avoiding tax liability.182  
Among the most famous fictions included creating false or highly 
exaggerated scenarios in order to satisfy conditions in the writ called 
trespass vi et armis, which required that the wrong be committed “with 
force and arms” (vi et armis).183 One example—the case of Rattlesdene v 
Grunestone (1317)—included a sale of wine where the buyer asserted that 
the seller had opened the wine—using the appropriate pleading language 
(“with force and arms drew”)—prior to delivery and replaced a substantial 
part of its content with salt water.184 In reality, this was probably a 
                                                                                                                                      
 182. See BAKER, supra note 180, at 242–43 (stating that the “incidents which most needed 
avoidance . . . arose when a tenant died and the fee descended to his heir. . . . [therefore t]he 
essence of most feudal tax-dodges was . . . to ensure that land did not descend to an heir.”); 
COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 108–10 (lists taxes that were imposed on landowners and 
attempts to reduce costs through tax evasion); Lobban, supra note 178, at 203–04 (discusses 
the evolution of the use of the statute De Donis to transfer real property). Famous reforms 
took place by King Edward I (reigned from 1272-1307) that shut down some of these 
loopholes discovered by lawyers that deprived lords of certain fees when property was, e.g. 
transferred to ecclesiastical bodies (“mortmain”) or through subinfeudation (process of 
dividing or returning land to new or prior tenants having the effect of greatly reducing dues). 
See THEODORE F.T. PUCKETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 30–31 (1956); 
COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 107–10; BAKER, supra note 180, at 242. 
 183. TWO BODIES supra note 159, at 41; COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 156. Injured 
parties at the start had to fit their claims into existing writs that had to be bought from the 
Chancery (King’s secretariat) and had to encapsulate the action being brought—otherwise 
the other party would not be forced to respond. COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 149–51; 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 89 (2009) (“fixed forms for fixed 
purposes”); see also TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 53 (“plaintiff whose case did not fit an 
existing writ might use the nearest writ and hope no one would object”); Peter Handfod, 
Intentional Negligence: A Contradiction in Terms, 32 SYDNEY L. REV. 29, 34 (2010) (“[T]he 
need to plead the standard writ formulae in order to persuade the common law courts to 
take jurisdiction caused pleaders, and perhaps the courts, to indulge in legal fictions. . . .”). 
Eventually, a number of innovations allowed for a more progressive approach to using writs. 
King Edward I’s Statute of Westminster II (1285) allowed for clerks to draft new (ad hoc) 
writs for the purpose of justice. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 151 (“[L]et a writ be 
made by those learned in the law so that for the future it shall not befall that the court fail in 
doing justice . . . .”). However, its usefulness, in the context of trespass writs, was 
questionable. See BAKER, supra note 180, at 62 (“It was nearly seventy years after 1285 before 
the abandonment of the vi et armis requirement in practice, and the fictions resorted to in 
the interim would have been unnecessary and absurd if the statute had already authorized 
the change.”). In the 1350s, perhaps occasioned by challenges created by the Black Plague, a 
new writ (trespass on the case) removed the vie et armis language. See BAKER, supra note 180, 
at 61–64. 
 184. BAKER, supra note 180, at 341 (2002); DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 44 (2001). Innovations like these allowed for something like the 
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fraudulent transaction or, as David Ibbetson suggests, a shipping 
accident.185 Because no one had to swear an affidavit to the underlying facts, 
clerks were able to issue the necessary writ despite the evidence of “force” 
being thin or non-existent.186 Reflecting on the writings of Sir Henry Maine, 
Michael Lobban writes: “fictions allowed the law to develop, while 
disguising the fact that it was changing. They maintained a sense of stability 
in law, at the same time that the law moulded [sic] itself to the needs of its 
community.”187 This idea was explained well by Maksymillian Del Mar who 
wrote that “[l]egal fictions . . . are created in the coal-face of legal change, 
which serves two masters: the conservative pressure of the system and the 
call of the injured pleading for a remedy.”188 If anything was clear, it is that 
jurists wanted the evolution of the law to bear the imprimatur of yesterday’s 
foundation.  
3. Bentham’s Warning 
Perhaps no one189 was a bigger enemy of legal fictions than Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1832), who compared fictions-to-justice with swindling-to-
trade;190 compared their usefulness-to-justice with poison-to-sustenance;191 
and, called them the “basest sort of lying.”192 In other places, he wrote that 
“the pestilential breath of Fiction poisons the sense of every instrument it 
                                                                                                                                      
action of trespass vi et armis to give rise to general actions for torts, contracts, and recovering 
property. See Lobban, supra note 178, at 200. 
 185. See IBBETSON, supra note 184, at 44. “Similar writs alleging the forcible extraction 
and adulteration of wine, all looking suspiciously like shipping accidents, are found 
throughout the fourteenth century.” Id. at 44–45. 
 186. BAKER, supra note 159, at 41. 
 187. Lobban, supra note 178, at 200.  
 188. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 228. 
 189. According to Del Mar, “the bulk of literature [on fictions] is negative in tone,” 
noting that fictions are not necessary in mature legal systems. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 
239. 
 190. 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 283 (Bowring’s edition, 1843); 
but see Michael Quinn, Fuller on Legal Fictions: A Benthamic Perspective, in LEGAL FICTIONS 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 56–57 (2015) (arguing that Bentham while critical of fictions did 
not reject them per se). As Michael Quinn outlines, Bentham was most bitter with a type of 
“theoretical fiction” which he simply called fallacies—e.g. natural law, social contract—which 
he considered to be dangerous when “swallowed whole by the mass of the people, since 
lawyers and politicians use them as if they were true.” Quinn, supra, at 65, 67 (emphasis 
added). If none of that is convincing, then there is always Bentham himself who admitted 
that “there was once a time, perhaps, when [fictions] had their use.” 1 BENTHAM, supra, at 
268.  
 191. 6 BENTHAM, supra note 190, at 582. 
 192. Id. 
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comes near”193 and “in English law, fiction is a syphilis, which runs in every 
vein, and carries into every part of the system the principle of rottenness.”194  
While Bentham’s protestations are certainly characteristic of his ornate 
writing, his warnings of the danger of legal fictions are well noted.195 
Looking to Bentham, Michael Quinn offers this stark analysis: “[t]he 
powerful know that to determine the terms of discussion is to rule. The 
point of legal fictions . . . is to divert attention and sow confusion, and 
thereby to stifle investigation.”196 While in fictions it may be that the 
audience is being deceived through the act of counterfactual-assertions—
perhaps driven toward a utilitarian purpose that ostensibly serves the public 
good—a danger remains when judges, driven by the whims of partisan 
alignment and expediency, fail to acknowledge that the tool of deceiving 
others may often become a tool of self-deception.197 A failure to examine 
these fictions and the underlying evidence that contradict leads to error in 
the development of the law and the harm that comes when deception is 
weaponized by one groups to rule over another.198  
These warnings should bring us pause when considering the utility of the 
non-distinction approach in its current sweep. While other uses for fictions 
                                                                                                                                      
 193. Id. at vol. 1, p. 235. 
 194. Id. at vol. 5, p. 92. 
 195. Maine had this to say about Bentham’s revulsion of fictions: “We must . . . not suffer 
ourselves to be affected by the ridicule which Bentham pours on legal fictions wherever he 
meets them. To revile them as merely fraudulent is to betray ignorance of their peculiar 
office in the historical development of law.” MAINE, supra note 159, at 26. 
 196. Quinn, supra note 190, at 67. 
 197. Id. at 68. 
 198. Id. “Fictions which become embedded in our mental furniture prevent salient 
questions from occurring to us, so that we think under the direction of an unconscious self-
denying ordinance.” Id.; see also Smith, supra note 159, at 153 (fictions “tend to prevent 
investigation as to the fundamental principle underlying a rule of law and to retard the 
framing of a statement of the rule in strictly accurate terms.”). Remarking on the acceptance 
of historical fictions uncritically, Pierre Olivier writes: 
It stands to reason that if a rule is accepted in vague and half-formulated form, 
the uncertainty surrounding it will sooner or later give rise to problems of 
application and eventually to costly litigation. Similarly, if the principle 
underlying a legal rule is neglected and represented by a fiction, the future 
development of the rule will remain in a morass of uncertainty. True 
development of the law is only possible by developing and extending its 
fundamental principles. In the absence of a clear insight into the principles 
underlying a legal rule, its application and extension cannot proceed in a 
rational and intelligent manner. 
PIERRE J.J. OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL SCIENCE 136 (Aubert eds. 1975). 
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exist,199 there are three particular sub-species that embrace the type of 
reasoning offered by the courts in Section III. 
B. Non-Distinction as Legal Fiction  
As noted above, the general approach to legal fictions is to understand 
them as useful statements or assumptions made in contradiction to known 
facts. A further definition that underlies the approaches below is the idea 
that fictions are useful because they allow the alteration of the law while still 
                                                                                                                                      
 199. While legal fictions have been shown to provide a number of useful procedural 
mechanisms throughout history (discussed above), they have also been used couch abstract 
ideas in an effort to help us better understand the world. Christoph Kletzer, Kelsen on 
Vaihinger, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 24 (2015). For example, a fiction can 
be used to assume that a thing existed that in fact had not (“metaphysical fictions”) or to 
explain, justify, or make sense of the law (“explanatory fictions”). Lobban, supra note 178, at 
204. A more interesting use involves assuming a historical lineage of a practice that had 
simply become fixed (“historical fictions”). Id.; see also FULLER, supra note 154, at 56 
(“[S]ome few may perhaps be intended as apologies for rules of law that have existed from 
the beginning of our legal system.”). Bentham remarks that the historical fiction was a 
“willful falsehood, having for its object the stealing [of] legislative power.” 1 BENTHAM, supra 
note 190, at 243. Among its other uses—as pointed out by Hans Kelsen—is that legal fictions 
provide an expedient way to subsume a case under an existing norm, which would otherwise 
not capture it—that is “to treat the case as if it fell under the legal norm.” Hans Kelsen, On 
the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special Consideration of Vaihinger’s Philosophy of the As-
If, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 14 (Christoph Kletzer trans. 2015). In this 
vein, Hans Vaihinger describes their use as a process towards “cognition of the actual world” 
by means of a “fabrication, a contradiction, a sleight of hand, a detour and passage of 
thought.” Id. at 4, 7 (“[I]t lies within the nature of fictions to entangle us in contradictions.”). 
A helpful analogy offered by Kelsen to understand fictions, especially why they can be 
characterized as detours, is a rock climber who purposely has to climb down in order to 
avoid some obstacle standing in the way of his final destination. Id. at 5. While the final 
destination is the “object of cognition,” the understanding of some particular legal order, the 
climb down as analogy for legal fiction connotes the idea of having to consciously assume 
something in contradiction to this final object in order to finally reach it. Id. Vaihinger 
writes:  
By its very own doing thought leads us onto certain pseudo-concepts just as 
seeing leads us into unavoidable optical illusions. As soon as we recognise this 
optical semblance as being necessary, as soon as we consciously accept the 
fictions created by it . . . and also see through them we can bear the ensuring 
logical contradictions as necessary products of our thought and reach the 
insight that they are the necessary consequences of the inner mechanism of the 
thinking organ itself. 
Id. at 7. Said more succinctly, the idea behind legal fictions is to “seemingly fashion legal 
truths out of factual falsehoods.” Lind, supra note 154, at 84. This latter usage will be 
discussed in much greater detail next to show how the non-distinction approach is a legal 
fiction. 
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retaining traces of a former system.200 While it is difficult to judge what is 
the underlying motive for using the non-distinction approach to form new 
legal rules,201 below are three approaches that explain the type of legal 
fiction that has been embraced.  
1. Lon Fuller: False Statements of Utility 
The first is the classical definition provided by Lon Fuller when he 
describes a fiction to be “either (1) a statement propounded with a complete 
or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as 
having utility.”202  
Following the reasoning from Vaihinger, Fuller considered that the 
quality of fictions is not by virtue of their truth or conformity with reality—
an incoherent standard since by definition fictions contradict reality—but 
in there utility for “simplifying and organizing data, and in converting new 
experiences into familiar terms.”203 This utility,204 central to Fuller’s own 
understanding of fictions, is connected with a conscious205 effort to improve 
the law.206 Fuller writes that while fictions are not meant to deceive,207 they 
do provide the means for changing the rule of law by judges taking on a 
legislative function in “acting under the influence of some half-articulate 
philosophy of law” that seems to them to be justified in light of prior 
formulas.208 While cognizant of the inadequacies of using fictions, judges do 
so nonetheless for lack of alternatives for expressing the same idea or 
                                                                                                                                      
 200. See Smith, supra note 159, at 149–50. The “purpose (and virtue) of the legal fiction 
was to ease the impact (and lessen the appearance) of legal change . . . .” Smith, supra note 
111, at 1470. Further, where the classical use was a device used for “softening,” new legal 
fictions are “instrumental in justifying doctrine, whether received or newly established.” Id. 
 201. Peter J. Smith notes that “new legal fictions [like their classical use] are sometimes a 
device that judges deploy to mask the fact that they are arrogating to themselves the power to 
make normative choices, and thus to make law itself.” Smith, supra note 111, at 1469. 
 202. FULLER, supra note 154, at 9 (emphasis added); Smith, supra note 111, at 1466 
(“Fuller provided the most comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon . . . .”). 
 203. Quinn, supra note 190, at 56 (citation omitted). 
 204. Fuller admits that Vaihinger’s philosophy bears a close similarity with American 
pragmatism. FULLER, supra note 154, at 96. 
 205. Fuller is keen on the idea that “[a] fiction becomes wholly safe only when it is used 
with a complete consciousness of its falsity.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). A fiction may be “an 
expedient, but consciously false, assumption.” Id. at 7, 9 (citation omitted). 
 206. Lind, supra note 154, at 85; see also FULLER, supra note 154, at 9–10 (“A fiction taken 
seriously . . . becomes dangerous and loses its utility.”). 
 207. While certainly possible for fictions to be implicated by a process of deceit, Fuller 
writes that its original use was not intended to serve this function. FULLER, supra note 154, at 
7, 57 (“[I]t is . . . difficult to see how the supposed deceit could actually succeed.”). 
 208. Id. He goes on, “[fictions] may, perhaps, be held accountable as accomplice in a 
process of deception, but not as principal.” Id. 
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developing a similar doctrine.209 Interpreting the implicit suggestions of 
Vaihinger, Fuller writes that our minds undergo a process of reducing 
reality into something we are more familiar with or converting new 
experiences into familiar terms.210   
Maybe more interestingly is not how the process works, but why it 
works. The question posed by Vaihinger is instructive for our general 
discussion on the non-distinction approach: “How does it come about that 
with consciously false ideas we are yet able to reach conclusions that are 
right?”211 Fuller, in discussing motives for fictions,212 argues that fictions are 
often implemented as devices to escape existing laws or “vague principle of 
jurisprudence or morals.”213 If the right under the First Amendment stands 
to apply to sellers of goods in the public arena, then judges must necessarily 
remove the protection of the First Amendment in order to realign the 
present cases with fact patterns formerly rejected (i.e., racial invidious 
discrimination).  
Among the useful analogies offered by Fuller is the one comparing legal 
fictions to scaffolds supporting “new developments in thought,” noting that 
once the building is complete, the scaffolds are removed so long as the 
falsity of the claim is readily acknowledged.214 This allows the “defects” of 
                                                                                                                                      
 209. Id. at 8, 10. “A judge may find himself forced to employ a fiction because of his 
inability to state his result in nonfictitious terms.” Id. at 64. Furthermore, “the fiction is often 
but a cruder outcropping of a process of intellectual adaptation which goes on constantly 
without attracting attention.” Id. at 66 (emphasis added). This statement corresponds closely 
with the pragmatic realignment approach—especially, within the premise of adapting new 
rules into old categories with minimal disturbance. Infra. Section IV.A.iii. 
 210. FULLER, supra note 154, at 106. 
 211. Id. at 103. 
 212. Fuller notes that although discovering the motives for fictions is important, the 
process is certainly difficult and leads us into a “conjectural field.” Id. at 8. He writes that 
“[o]ne can scarcely conceive of a more complex and speculative problem than that of human 
motives.” Id. at 49; see also Kenneth Campbell, Fuller on Legal Fictions, 2 LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 339, 346–47 (1983) (“Reference to motivations . . . tends to be rather more 
ambiguous between conscious reasons and the unconscious desires and beliefs that lead to 
performance of that action.”). 
 213. FULLER, supra note 154, at 53. The example Fuller provides for escaping “existing 
rules” is the introduction of the attractive nuisance doctrine that would otherwise not apply 
given the existing laws that says “no duty [of care to] . . . trespassers.” Id. at 53, 66–68. 
 214. Quinn, supra note 190, at 67. This metaphor was coined by John Chipman Gray. 
Knauer, supra note 157, at 11. Bentham thinks that removing this scaffold should be 
immediate once his own model is available, noting it to be “a disgrace to the architect that 
rubbish and scaffolding should continue in any part to deform the building.” Quinn, supra 
note 190, at 67. I tend to agree that the fiction of non-distinction, although meriting some 
utility in unique factual circumstances that lead to the correct legal conclusion, should be 
immediately removed when another approach based on a more sophisticated examination of 
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existing laws on speech and religion—as rightly applied to protecting a right 
of refusal for expressive acts—to give way to a traditional interest of ridding 
invidious discrimination by the process of applying the non-distinction 
approach. As Fuller writes, “[T]he fiction is the cement that is always at 
hand to plaster together the weak spots in our intellectual structure.”215 This 
approach allows the judge a sense of emotional conservatism, a self-
deception that the existing rules do in fact determine the case and that no-
real innovation has taken place.216  
This idea is further elaborated when we look to the pragmatic approach 
(below). For now, it is worth noting how well this connects to Fuller’s 
discussion of linguistics217 and the use of terms like “discrimination” to 
apply to the cases in Section III. The non-distinction approach has the 
benefit of, not only aligning the scaffold with an old and rejected tradition 
that allowed for race-based discrimination, but also allowing for the same 
consequences to apply to a novel act (i.e., refusing an artistic request based 
on fears of endorsing sinful behavior) in a way that produces the same 
normative consequences.218 This is further elaborated in our second 
approach. 
                                                                                                                                      
the facts can be applied. As Jeremiah Smith writes, while the scaffolding serves a function 
while the building is in construction, after it is complete, it serves only to obscure it. Smith, 
supra note 159, at 155. 
 215. FULLER, supra note 154, at 52. 
 216. Id. at 58; see also Smith, supra note 159, at 150 (The fiction is “frequently resorted to 
in the attempt to conceal the fact that the law is undergoing alteration at the hands of the 
judges.”). 
 217. “The fiction is further a phenomenon of language in the sense that the question 
whether a given statement is a fiction is always, when examined critically, a question of the 
proprieties of language.” FULLER, supra note 154, at 11. To the question of whether all 
fictions should be rejected, Fuller writes that this approach is inadvisable given how much 
fictions have become “the growing pains of the language of the law.” Id. at 22. His answer is 
one of moderation: some fictions should be rejected, others retained. Id. 
 218. Borrowing from Fuller’s discussion on legal relations that are “accurately described 
and actually enforced” (e.g., the way the law talks about a husband and a wife) as distinct 
from fictions—in the context of a legal relationship between the act of refusing a certain 
request from same-sex couples and the requisite intent for invidious discrimination, the 
non-distinction approach is “inadequate and misleading.” See id. at 33. While courts 
seemingly imply that the legal relation between a seller and a buyer in the above-mentioned 
cases is one of discriminatory intent in violation of the state’s antidiscrimination laws, this is 
simply an inaccurate description which leads to a false application of law (or at least what the 
law intended to protect). 
704 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:663 
 
2. Maksymilian Del Mar: Suspension of Operative Facts 
Maksymilian Del Mar talks about a second way of using fictions that 
relates back to the non-distinction approach.219 This approach involves 
suspending one or more of the operative facts required for an “associated 
normative consequence” when proof is absent or proof of the opposite is 
available.220 An abstract example of this is offered by Peter Birks that goes 
like this. A normative consequence “X” can be achieved so long as four 
(hypothetical) elements are met: A, B, C, and D.221 However, judicial 
determination over time may allow the same results (i.e., X) if the claimants 
can show any two of the elements—say A and D or A, D, and Z.222 So, 
despite future claimants still being able to reach the same normative 
consequence by showing all four elements (i.e., A, B, C, and D), a new 
method has been developed over time that allows for a showing of only two 
elements to reach the same normative consequences as if all four elements 
had been met.223  
This approach is akin to the idea mentioned in the context of the 
common law where fictions allowed the law to grope its way towards a 
principle.224 Unlike Fuller’s approach, this one does not require a 
“consciousness of falsity” and really relates to those instances where issues 
exist with finding available proof.225 Unlike Bentham, Del Mar sees the 
benefits of fictions and believes that if used wisely, over time, they can 
provide to courts a dynamic resource to “balance flexibility and 
responsiveness with stability and predictability.”226 Like Fuller’s scaffold that 
supports the development of thought over time (as evidence in common 
law), Del Mar offers an analogy to building blocks that possess the quality of 
being shaped or removed in an effort to create a more stable structure.227 
Unlike the views of Maine or Pound that dismissed the need for fictions in a 
                                                                                                                                      
 219. Del Mar, supra note 179. 
 220. Id. at 226, 229–30.  
 221. Id. at 235. 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. (citing Peter Birks, Fictions ancient and modern, in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS FOR 
TONY HONORÉ 86 (MacCormick and Birks eds., 1986). Baker writes, 
The essence of the classic English fiction is that proof of a certain fact asserted 
in a lawsuit was completely dispensed with by the simple expedient of denying 
any means of disputing it. The false allegation in such cases was of some fact 
which had once been required [is] . . . no longer regarded as material. 
TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 41. 
 224. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 235. 
 225. Id. at 226. 
 226. Id. at 227. 
 227. Id.  
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developed system,228 Del Mar considers their benefits as tools for 
suspending certain operative facts “already [attached to] existing rule’s 
normative consequences.”229  
As this relates to the non-distinction approach, claimants today bringing 
a claim of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (identity) are 
able to couch their language in the historical prohibition on invidious 
discrimination per se (e.g., racism) without having to prove that the actions 
themselves have anything to do with the customer’s identity.230 While a sign 
on the door of a business saying “No Blacks Allowed” was evidence of per se 
discrimination since the owner would not even entertain the order; today, 
the refusal of any request that is “inextricable connected” with the 
customers identity becomes a per se violation on the basis of identity. All 
this despite the pleadings before the court. Notably, in the outlier cases such 
as Hands On Original, the court refused to adopt the non-distinction 
approach because the judge refused to assign the wrongful act of invidious 
discrimination to a simple act of refusal without further evidence (i.e., A, B, 
C, and D). 
Notwithstanding the benefits of using fictions, the danger of 
prematurely231 suspending operative facts is expressed well by John Baker 
when he—mindful of the changing character of legal fictions—wrote that 
the use of fictions might at first “slip into practice without challenge, and if 
repeated often enough could become so rooted that a future challenge 
would be unlikely to succeed.”232 With further repetition, the practice will 
be introduced into more contentious issues, “provided that they were seen to 
                                                                                                                                      
 228. Maine considered fictions to be among the three ways that the law could be 
changed—the other two being equity and legislation. MAINE, supra note 159, at 24. Roscoe 
Pound similarly found that fictions were useful in developing the law in legal history, but like 
Maine, believed fictions were “clumsy device[s] . . . not suited to later times and developed 
systems,” in fact acting to “retard growth and clog development.” Pound, supra note 179, at 
465–66. 
 229. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 241.  
 230. As Baker notes, “The object of fictions is that they allow the operation of the law to 
change while avoiding any outward alteration in the rules.” TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 
35. This idea is further connected with the minimal disturbance approach taken by Douglas 
Lind discussed in Section IV.B.iii and what Daniel R. Coquillette noted in his excellent book 
on Anglo-American Legal Heritage, he writes: “Fictions permit useful incremental reform, 
when wide scale reform is too threatening.” COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 283. 
 231. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 237 (“[W]e need to see that it is only after a period of 
time that it becomes (or might become) clear that a certain operative act can be 
dispensed . . . .”). 
 232. Id. (quoting TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 54). This is reminiscent of what Roscoe 
Pound called the “dogmatic fictions” that are worked out as a means for providing a rational 
explanation for existing precepts. Pound, supra note 179, at 455, 460.  
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have a just objective.”233 Importantly, Del Mar sees that his approach as a 
study of “common law epistemology” (i.e., the process of how we come to 
know or understand the law) is something resolutely pragmatic.234 This idea 
of pragmatism is where we turn to next. 
3. Douglas Lind: Pragmatism of Re-Alignment 
The third and final approach discussed here under the rubric of legal 
fictions in relation to the non-distinction approach is the idea of using 
fictions as a pragmatic tool to bring current facts in re-alignment with 
traditional norms—to make use of fictions in solving new problems.235 This 
idea—alongside those mentioned above—was also introduced by Fuller 
when he described the motive of convenience, which involves the changing 
or adapting of the law through devises that appear to uphold a traditional 
way of thinking.236 The idea connecting fictions with utility was also hinted 
on by Del Mar in the above section and will now be discussed in more detail 
looking to the writings of William James237 and Douglas Lind.238  
Specific to our discussion surrounding the common law, David Ibbetson 
has a helpful starting point in understanding the idea of “pragmatic 
incrementalism [as] the spirit of change in the common law.”239 He writes, 
Legal change occurs through filling in gaps between rules in the 
way that seems most convenient or most just at the time; through 
twisting existing rules, or rediscovering old ones, to give the 
impression that a change in the law is no more than the 
application of the law that was already in place; through 
reformulating claims into a different conceptual category, 
normally one less encumbered by restrictive rules; through 
inventing new rules that get tacked onto the existing ones; . . . 
through injecting shifting ideas of fairness and justice; and, very 
                                                                                                                                      
 233. TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 54 (emphasis added). 
 234. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 238. 
 235. See FULLER, supra note 154, at 94 (“[F]iction is generally the product of the law’s 
struggles with new problems”).  
 236. See id. at 59–70 (allowing for “assimilating that which is unfamiliar to that which is 
already known”). Quoting Savigny: “When a new juridical form arises it is joined directly on 
to an old and existing institution and in this way the certainty and development of the old is 
procured for the new.” Id. at 59 (citation omitted). While the judge may use nonfictitious 
language, he uses a fiction with an intent to bring a preferred legal “reform within the 
linguistic cover of existing law” in order to “avoid discommoding current notions.” Id. at 62. 
 237. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM (2003). 
 238. Lind, supra note 154. 
 239. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 244. 
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occasionally, through adopting wholesale procrustean theoretical 
frameworks into which the exiting law can be squeezed.240 
Lind takes to the optimism of Del Mar in seeing that the use of fictions 
can be a useful tool for advancing the law.241 He proposes that they be 
understood as “true legal propositions asserted with conscious recognition 
that they are inconsistent . . . with true propositions asserted within some 
other linguistic system (or elsewhere within law).”242 If used correctly, legal 
fictions243 will inflict no damage and allow for the development of a better 
system of rules.244 If used incorrectly, legal fictions can have the effect of 
“upsett[ing] settled meanings or truths, work injustice, or mask underlying 
processes of legal reasoning.”245  
Taking to the writings of William James, Lind discusses the idea of 
truth—being suspended from absoluteness—can be used as a practical 
means toward some problem or purpose.246 That truth is an instrument for 
carving out those things suitable to our preference—guided by our 
conception of reality—in an every changing world of experience.247 Looking 
to a stock of new information, William James argues that “we are all 
extreme conservatives” for we all seek to realign our new gained 
                                                                                                                                      
 240. DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATION 294 
(1999). 
 241. Lind, supra note 154, at 84. Lind writes that legal fictions treated as conscious false 
assumptions is regrettable since this creates “logical confusion, renders fictions unnecessarily 
confounding, and compromises the integrity of law and judicial decision-making.” Id. 
Sidney T. Miler likewise shares in their optimism, writing: “legal fictions, which required the 
play of some fancy in their beginning, have fallen not only into disuse but also into disfavor. 
Many of them, however, have done good work in the past, and some are doing it now.” 
Miller, supra note 166, at 623. 
 242. Lind, supra note 154, at 84. This is reminiscent of Baker’s discussion of the rule of 
law as distinct from fictions since developing legal systems imply the use of certain concepts 
for certain legal purposes that no one believes are actually true. See TWO BODIES, supra note 
159, at 44–45.  
 243. Lind calls them a “form of creative lawmaking, a phenomenon of legal (primarily 
judicial) technique employed to resolve trouble in the legal environment.” Lind, supra note 
154, at 84. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 88–90; see also JAMES, supra note 237, at 97 (“The true . . . is only the expedient 
in the way of our thinking.”). Lind writes that “the truth of a proposition depends on its 
‘consequences to someone engaged on a real problem for some purpose.’” Lind, supra note 
154, at 90 (quoting F.C.S. SCHILLER, HUMANISM: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 59 (1903)). 
 247. Id. at 90–91.  
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information with old trains of thought.248 Our commitment to the old ways 
often meets the demands for radical modification when we meet new facts 
tending to contradict our traditional notions.249 If the old cannot survive 
and a blanket change of opinion is not an option, we seek to graft the new 
facts within our existing systems with minimum disturbance—the new 
experiences allowed to refine our previous belief.250 We try to fit new wine 
into old wineskins—“gear[ing] the new idea into a workable notion that 
reconciles satisfactorily the new truth and the old stock.”251  
From there, Lind applies this same thinking to legal fictions as a tool 
within a specific system used in an effort to assimilate new information to a 
traditional approach.252 His ultimate goal in applying this method is to get 
away from the thinking that legal fictions are legal falsehoods and to see 
their propositions—in light of the specific legal system—as, in fact, true.253 
Under this model, statements like “a corporation is a person” must be 
                                                                                                                                      
 248. JAMES, supra note 237, at 26; see also FULLER, supra note 154, at 82 (defining 
“intellectual conservatism” as “the fiction that makes a new legal conclusion ‘thinkable’ by 
converting it into familiar terms”). As noted above, Fuller also argues that implicit in the 
discussion of Vaihinger is the process of converting new experiences into familiar terms. See 
also FULLER, supra note 154, at 106 n.21. “Vaihinger’s fundamental theses it that our minds 
do not merely reflect reality, but alter it and ‘work it over’ to suit our needs.” Id. at 115; see 
also Lind, supra note 154, at 91 (“Loyalty to the older truths is the first principle in this 
process; most often it wins out.”). 
 249. JAMES, supra note 237, at 26. 
 250. Id.; Lind, supra note 154, at 92. “The truths we fashion from experience and 
reflection accordingly are ‘effective in just the degree in which [they have] been worked into 
a system—a comprehensive and orderly arrangement.’” Id. (quoting JOHN DEWEY, ESSAYS IN 
EXPERIMENT LOGIC 54 (1916)). 
 251. Lind, supra note 154, at 91. “[The new idea] preserves the older stock of truths with 
a minimum of modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit the novelty, 
but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible . . . New truth is always a 
go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact as ever to 
show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity.” JAMES, supra note 237, at 27. As Baker 
notes, fictions may correspond to our experiences that “it is more convenient, more fitting, 
and perhaps more comforting, to preserve the traditional forms over the centuries while 
modifying—sometimes drastically changing—their operation.” TWO BODIES, supra note 159, 
at 48. Speaking on the human tendency to convert sad events into happy ones, Tourtoulon 
writes that the “lawmaker sometimes tries . . . to efface unfortunate realities as far as possible 
and to evoke the shades of fortunate realities which have not been achieved.” TOURTOULON, 
supra note 165, at 386 (emphasis added).  
 252. Lind, supra note 154, at 91. 
 253. Id. at 93. “By the pragmatist understanding, an utterance in the form of a legal 
fiction, such as ‘A corporation is a person’, must be investigated for meaning and evaluated 
for truth strictly within law.” Id. In this sense, the non-distinction approach is still a legal 
fiction, but now a true proposition if seen strictly within the law (subject to the interpretation 
of reliance verses discussed in Section V.A.). 
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investigated for meaning and/or evaluated for truth strictly within law.254 In 
this sense, the non-distinction approach is still a legal fiction, but now a true 
proposition if seen strictly within the law—subject now to attack based on, 
inter alia, reliance verses and proper distinctions (discussed in Section V) 
that make up the legal construction of this proverbial scaffold. 
Considering the re-alignment approach in the context of the above-
mentioned cases. Courts are taking new facts, stripping the claimant’s 
contextual reliance on the First Amendment where the Constitution would 
otherwise protect them, and re-aligning the present debate on sexual 
orientation in the framework of race-based antidiscrimination laws. This is 
arguably done not based on the merit of the non-distinction approach, but 
as Lind described, to create minimum disturbance and maximum 
continuity. Seeing the vitriolic outcry, the emotional toll on same-sex 
claimants, and the negative popular press surrounding these businesses that 
refuse to serve gay couples, this shift is understandable. Tourtoulon 
summarizes these sentiments well when he writes that while “the fiction is a 
subtle instrument of juridical technic, it is also clearly the expression of a 
desire inherent in human nature, the desire to efface unpleasant realities 
and evoke imaginary good fortune.”255 The past struggles of the gay 
community are real and the desire to retain their present momentum is 
important. But at what cost? 
a. A problem of overflow 
Even if we grant the re-alignment approach as a just theory, and that the 
falsity of legal propositions in everyday life does not affect the 
“proposition’s truth value within law,”256 decisions made by the court 
cannot be hermetically sealed off from popular opinion. The press is 
treating those opinions as if they were true, thus introducing a second-level 
conflation (first being the non-distinction approach) between truth within 
the law—and, now, truths in the public square (despite meaning and truth 
being found strictly within the law).257 Lind himself points out that legal 
                                                                                                                                      
 254. Id. 
 255. TOURTOULON, supra note 165, at 386. 
 256. Lind, supra note 154, at 93. 
 257. Fuller writes that economist’s use of the term “economic animal” has utility if used 
to develop laws of economics, but if used to develop foundations in ethics would be 
disastrous. FULLER, supra note 154, at 107. Fuller writes: “For certain purposes it is useful to 
exclude the field of morality from that of law. But again, the separation must be regarded as 
provisional only. It must not be taken for a permanent reality.” Id. 
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fictions have value to the extent they “work no havoc on any general stock 
of beliefs outside law.”258  
While there is some benefit in using legal fictions that yield only 
“harmless inconsistency while working some functional utility or 
effectiveness within law,”259 the non-distinction approach has caused great 
economic and emotional harm to individuals like Melissa Klein, Barronelle 
Stutzman, and Jack Phillips, thanks to the rhetoric of re-aligning their 
identities with Jim Crow racists. This is why it is important to stress the 
“gulf between reality and fiction”—keeping a close eye on the two and the 
consequences of conflating one into the other.260 The court’s use of legal 
fictions as a pragmatic tool by the process of employing the non-distinction 
approach is among those nefarious uses mentioned by Lind that tends to be 
a tool for distorting the settled application of the First Amendment, while 
seemingly masking the underlying processes of legal reasoning behind a veil 
of political expediency as an effort to protect the dignity of the LGBT 
community. We turn next to challenging some of the foundations of the 
scaffold developed through the non-distinction approach and suggest a 
subtle shift in our legal thinking that allows for religious claimants to assert 
first amendment defenses while preserving antidiscrimination laws in their 
proper context.  
V.  BETWEEN SANCTION AND PERSECUTION 
Where the common law used the instrument of fictions to develop a 
system better fitted to the claimants specific requests, I have argued that the 
non-distinction approach today advances the purpose of protecting the 
dignity of the LGBT community while insuring the survival of 
antidiscrimination laws as a tool for social transformation.261 By realigning 
                                                                                                                                      
 258. Lind, supra note 154, at 94. Jurist Matthew Hale notes that “though fictions be a 
shew of something that is not . . . they are but expedients without injuring anybody to bring 
men to their rights.” MATTHEW HALE AND WILLIAM FLEETWOOD, HALE AND FLEETWOOD ON 
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 24 (Prichard and Yale eds., 1993); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 43 (Lewis ed., 1897) (“no fiction shall extend to 
work an injury”).  
 259. Id.; see also TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 54 (“[T]here was a maxim that legal 
fictions ought not to hurt anyone.”). 
 260. See HANS VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF AS IF 105–06 (Ogden trans., 1935). 
 261. For those concerned with the treatment and dignity of the LGBT community 
understandably would like to use fictions to ensure that the fortunes of the law fall in favor of 
the LGBT claimants. Tourtoulon writes: “While the fiction is a subtle instrument of juridical 
technique, it is also clearly the expression of a desire inherent in human nature, the desire to 
efface unpleasant realities and evoke imaginary good fortune.” TOURTOULON , supra note 
165, at 386. 
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the present debate with the post-Civil War era attempts to oppress the 
African American community, the law has developed a strong normative 
case for a sweeping application of antidiscrimination laws notwithstanding 
First Amendment defenses.  
However, this is not the only way that the law can approach the joint 
interest of protecting dignity and ensuring that antidiscrimination laws are 
not upended. There is another, a more adequate approach,262 to ensure a 
balance between giving to bigotry no sanction and to persecution no 
assistance. This approach looks first to some of the foundational pieces of 
the non-distinction approach (i.e., reliance verses and non-distinction) in 
an effort to challenge their application in certain cases. Next, it argues for a 
three-part framework that converts the conclusory nature of the non-
distinction approach into an opportunity for rebuttal. 
A. Casting a Wider Framework 
The means to resolve this problem begins with an honest assessment of 
the major cases relied on by state courts to drive the application for the 
non-distinction approach and the realization that a distinction does in fact 
exist. To use an expression from J.H. Baker, we need the “veil to be lifted, or 
dropped”263 in an effort to advance the proper use of legal language so that 
the proper normative consequences apply. 
1. Reliance Verses 
While tracing the origin of the non-distinction approach can only yield a 
tentative conclusion,264 the cases listed above continue to return to 
essentially the same proof-texts from the Supreme Court that allegedly 
“rejected . . . attempts to distinguish between a protected status and conduct 
closely correlated with that status.”265 Courts have generally focused 
exclusively on the same four cases, using essentially the same boilerplate 
                                                                                                                                      
 262. “[T]he fiction is always ready to give way to a more ‘adequate’ explanation.” FULLER, 
supra note 154, at 71. 
 263. TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 42. 
 264. Cf. id. at 35 (stating that the “precise origin of a fictional device is . . . almost always 
beyond recovery”). 
 265. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 61 (N.M. 2013). The Superior 
Court in Arlene’s Flowers uses the language of a long held tradition from the U.S. Supreme 
Court, “that discrimination based on conduct associated with a protected characteristic 
constitutes discrimination on the basis of that characteristic.” Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 
720213, at *15 (Wash. Super. 2015) (internal citations omitted).  
712 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:663 
 
citations, without much further discussion as to the appropriateness of 
application.266  
For example, courts looked to Bob Jones University in support, citing 
parenthetically that the Supreme Court held that “discrimination on the 
basis of racial affiliation and association is a form of racial 
discrimination.”267 Given Bob Jones’ racist history of excluding black 
students until 1971,268 hardly anyone is still questioning the underlying 
motive of the school in targeting black students on the basis of identity. The 
fact that Bob Jones has since apologized for what it called “racially hurtful” 
policies is indicative of a failure acknowledged by most.269 Developing legal 
precedent through imputation of bad-faith motivation from attenuated 
analogies is precisely what undergirds the utility of legal fictions. 
Similarly, Lawrence v. Texas270 does little to advance a sound approach to 
justifying a non-distinction approach. While the Court in Lawrence was 
right to strike down the conduct-based regulation on same-sex sodomy 
upheld in Bowers,271 any relevant cross-application would require the shift 
from the commission of certain acts to a state mandated endorsement of 
those, now decriminalized, acts.272 This step moves us beyond Lawrence;273 
which, while emphasizing the liberty of thought, belief, and expression on 
                                                                                                                                      
 266. See, e.g., Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 61–62; Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 
370 P.3d 272, 280-81 (Colo. App. 2015); Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *15 (Wash. 
Super. 2015). 
 267. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983). 
 268. Id. at 580. 
 269. Statement about Race at BJU, BOB JONES UNIV. (2008), available at 
http://www.bju.edu/about/what-we-believe/race-statement.php. 
 270. The language lifted from Lawrence is, “When homosexual conduct is made criminal 
by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual 
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.” Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
 271. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1985) (The Court was unwilling to 
announce “a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.”), overruled by Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 272. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (“The issue is whether the majority may use the power of 
the State to enforce these views on the whole society.”).  
 273. Although proving a way for the conflation, as pointed out by Professor Nejaime:  
In linking sexual-orientation-based identity to sexual orientation-based liberty 
(status to conduct), Kennedy connected the more ephemeral sexual 
relationship between the petitioners to more permanent same-sex relationships, 
thereby suggesting the way in which relationships are linked to the 
actualization of identity. 
Nejaime, supra note 56, at 1216.  
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par with intimate conduct,274 stressed that historical voices condemning 
homosexual conduct does not mean that “the majority may use the power 
of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of 
the criminal law.”275 Using Lawrence to prop up a new theory on non-
distinction, at best, is to retroactively insert an answer into the opinion to a 
question that was never raised. At worst, it would support the idea that a 
majority may enforce its own moral code on the tiny number of business 
owners who consider compliance to be sinful.276 
The same is true for using Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, typically 
cited to support the non-distinction approach based on the language meant 
to be applied only in that context. For example, the court in Arlene’s Flowers 
cites Martinez with the parenthetical that reads: “University student group's 
claim that it did not prohibit gay members, only those who engaged in or 
supported same-sex intimacy rejected because prior decisions ‘have 
declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context.’”277 This 
statement is instructive since whether the group refused to allow gay 
members based on identity or conduct is irrelevant since the school’s all-
comers policy never required that distinction. As the Court noted, Hastings 
interprets the all-comers policy to require that student groups “‘allow any 
student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the 
organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs.’”278 The Court, in 
discussing the potential for making a distinction for excluding certain 
students from the all-comers policy, noted the “daunting labor” required of 
Hastings to determine whether a student organization is discriminating 
based on identity or belief.279 As a remedy for these concerns, neither the 
Court, nor Hastings interpreted the non-discrimination policy to conflate 
conduct and belief discrimination. Instead, to help the school police its 
policy without having to decipher intent based on status or belief, the Court 
deferred to the school’s own interpretation that either would be barred in 
                                                                                                                                      
 274. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 275. Id. at 571 (emphasis added). 
 276. See id. 
 277. Arlene's Flowers, No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213, at *15 (Wash. Super. Feb 18, 
2015) (emphasis added). 
 278. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 671 (2010). In rejecting the 
Christian Legal Societies request for exemption, Hastings reiterated this point by saying that 
“CLS must open its membership to all students irrespective of their religious beliefs or sexual 
orientation.” Id. at 673. 
 279. Id. at 688. As the Court stated in its discussion over viewpoint neutrality, “[t]he Law 
School's policy aims at the act of rejecting would-be group members without reference to the 
reasons motivating that behavior.” Id. at 696. 
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this context.280 This context is one based on the reasonableness of 
withholding certain benefits and not based on prohibiting certain actions by 
force of law that carries a higher burden of proof typically associated for 
non-compliance.281  
The final case is Bray v. Alexandria, where Justice Scalia wrote that “[a] 
tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.”282 While certainly possible,283 
this statement is not necessarily true and should not be used as a per se basis 
for concluding that a restriction on conduct “serves to disrespect and 
subordinate”284 the individual. The Supreme Court acknowledged in 
Goldman v. Weinberger that a policy on visible religious articles of clothing 
in the military is a reasonable requirement meant to ensure uniformity.285 
The Court even noted that for petitioners like Mr. Goldman who wanted to 
wear a yarmulke to express his faith, military life and its regulations may 
not be suitable.286 
While the cases certainly invoke the appropriateness of distinguishing 
between status and belief, they do nothing to construct a doctrine that 
allows for conclusive conflation of the two. Proper distinctions must be 
made in certain instances, which is where we turn to next—picking up 
where we left off in Bray. 
2. Proper Distinction 
The Court in Bray laid out the principles for making the type of 
distinction being argued in this Article. Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, made these keen observations, worth quoting in full: 
Some activities may be such an irrational object of disfavor that, 
if they are targeted, and if they also happen to be engaged in 
exclusively or predominantly by a particular class of people, an 
intent to disfavor that class can readily be presumed. But 
opposition to voluntary abortion cannot possibly be considered 
                                                                                                                                      
 280. Id. at 688–89. 
 281. Id. at 682–83 (“Hastings, through its RSO program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, 
not wielding the stick of prohibition.”). 
 282. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993). Case otherwise 
had nothing to do with Judaism, but with buffer zones around abortion clinics. Id. at 266. 
 283. The case City of Hialeah is instructive. There, the Supreme Court struck down a law 
that intentionally targeted a group of followers who conducted ritualized slaughters. See 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (“[I]t is 
only conduct motivated by religious conviction that bears the weight of the governmental 
restrictions.”). 
 284. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015). 
 285. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986). 
 286. Id. at 509. 
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such an irrational surrogate for opposition to (or paternalism 
towards) women. Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be 
denied that there are common and respectable reasons for 
opposing it, other than hatred of, or condescension toward (or 
indeed any view at all concerning), women as a class—as is 
evident from the fact that men and women are on both sides of 
the issue, just as men and women are on both sides of petitioners' 
unlawful demonstrations.287 
These same sentiments were expressed by Justice Kennedy (who joined the 
majority in Bray) when he wrote in Obergefell that opposing same-sex 
marriage can be “based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical 
premises.”288 Premises that in fact represent a comprehensive history 
defining the teleology behind marriage as an institution between one man 
and one woman inextricably connected with childbearing.289 The historical 
                                                                                                                                      
 287. Bray, 506 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added). 
 288. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. This statement in application seems in direct tension 
with Justice Kennedy’s other statement where he states that the “disability on gays and 
lesbians” created by marriage laws that prohibit same-sex marriage and the corresponding 
benefits “serves to disrespect and subordinate them.” Id. at 2604. As applied, by invoking the 
non-distinction approach, courts are disqualifying any notions of “decent and honorable” 
premises in objecting to serving a same-sex wedding by attaching the corresponding stigma 
with shopkeepers who refused to serve blacks. I hardly doubt anyone today will accept that 
“honorable and decent” premises exist to discriminate against blacks. Cf. Timothy J. Tracey, 
Bob Jonesing: Same-Sex Marriage and the Hankering to Strip Religious Institutions of Their 
Tax-Exempt Status, 11 FIU L. REV. 85, 86–87 (2015) (“The promise that people of faith may 
‘advocate’ and ‘teach’ their beliefs about marriage gives scant assurance that they can in fact 
act on those beliefs.”) The dissenters in Obergefell also expressed these concerns. For 
example, Justice Robert notes that the majority “suggests that religious believers may 
continue to ‘advocate’ and ‘teach’ their views on marriage,” while conspicuously failing to 
affirm the right to act (or exercise) on those beliefs. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2625 (Robert, J., 
dissenting). Justice Alito offered this prescient warning:  
Perhaps recognizing how its reasoning may be used, the majority attempts . . . 
to reassure those who oppose same-sex marriage that their rights of conscience 
will be protected . . . . We will soon see whether this proves to be true. I assume 
that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the 
recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk 
being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and 
schools. 
Id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 289. See, e.g. SHERIF GIRGIS ET AL., WHAT IS MARRIAGE 49–50 (2012) (noting a 2,400-year 
philosophical tradition “distinguish[ing] friendships . . . from those special relationships that 
extend two people’s union along the bodily dimension of their being and that are uniquely 
apt for, and enriched by, reproduction and childbearing”); JOHN WITTE JR., FROM SACRAMENT 
TO CONTRACT 17 (2012) (“The Western tradition inherited from ancient Greece and Rome 
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teaching of Christianity attests to this long-held view that marriage as union 
between one man and one woman is a part of its core teachings on sexual 
ethics and remains an inseparable part of Christian humanism.290 The 
Supreme Court had largely agreed with this definition up until Obergefell, 
including statements from Justice Brennan and Justice Kennedy, who 
acknowledged that marriage is a “basic civil right[] . . . fundamental to our 
very existence and survival”291 and that states may have “other reasons . . . to 
promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an 
excluded group.”292 To conflate an opposition to same-sex marriage as a 
standard definition for bigotry is simply to ignore the historical 
epistemology on marriage and to arbitrarily consigns certain viewpoints to 
extinction.  
As an illustration of this point: an amicus brief was filed in the 
Washington State Supreme Court in favor of Arlene’s Flowers—signed by 
nearly thirty of today’s leading First Amendment scholars on both sides of 
the marriage debate.293 What this brief argues against is what this Article has 
described as the court’s non-distinction approach. Namely, a proper 
distinction must be made between Mrs. Stutzman’s religious objection in 
celebrating a same-sex marriage and her particular non-objection to serving 
same-sex customers.294 By failing to make this distinction, the brief argues 
that the Washington Superior Court, in ruling against Mrs. Stutzman, 
undervalued her “constitutional rights by misinterpreting her religious 
convictions as offensive and invidious.”295 While the brief points out 
instances of discriminatory practices based on secondary justifications (i.e., 
refusing entrance to black customers for fears of being robbed)—without 
which antidiscrimination laws could not survive—it distinguishes the facts 
in Arlene’s Flowers because the justification offered by Mrs. Stutzman for 
her refusal was unrelated to the couples sexual orientation.296 While it is 
possible that Mrs. Stutzman and others will use some pretense as a cover for 
                                                                                                                                      
the idea that marriage is a union of a single man and single woman who unite for the 
purposes of mutual love and friendship and mutual procreation and nurture of children.”). 
 290. Matthew J. Franck, Introduction, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS 5–6 
(Timothy S. Shah et al, eds. 2016). 
 291. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 292. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003). 
 293. Legal Scholar’s Brief, supra note 17.  
 294. Id. at 3. 
 295. Id. at 4. 
 296. Id. at 6. As the brief points out from the record, Arlene’s Flowers has sold 
“thousands of dollars worth of arranged flowers [to one of the Appellees] without 
reservation, over a nine-year period, with full knowledge that [he] is gay and that many of 
the arrangements were intended for his same-sex partner.” Id. at 3. 
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bigotry, the court cannot simply assume that into the record, but, instead, 
must delve deeper into the sincerity of the claim.297  
Notably, the amicus brief cites Lawrence as an example of when “courts . 
. . treated an articulated objection to conduct as equivalent to animus 
against persons who characteristically engage in such conduct.”298 Although 
it may be plausible in certain instances to make this type of conflation (i.e., 
non-distinction approach), the brief warned—citing the “decent and 
honorable” language from Justice Kennedy in describing opposition to 
same-sex marriage299—that “judges should be cautious about inferring that 
disapproval of conduct is a manifestation of animus against persons.”300 As it 
applies to Mrs. Stutzman, the brief concludes that making this inference is 
“utterly implausible.”301 Having done so, the conflation (or non-distinction) 
infected the court’s determination of “prima facie liability” and its 
“dismissive treatment of [Mrs. Stutzman’s] constitutional defenses.”302  
This was the correct approach and one that I attempt to incorporate in 
the next Section by advocating a shift from fictions to rebuttable 
presumptions—being mindful of the need to preserve antidiscrimination 
laws. 
B. From Fictions to Presumptions 
The use of fictions today is still evident,303 but oftentimes difficult to 
distinguish between presumptions304 since the two are traditionally 
                                                                                                                                      
 297. Id. at 6.  
 298. Id. at 7.  
 299. The brief notes that the language from Justice Kennedy “strongly counsels against 
conflating a sincere religious objection to promoting same-sex marriage with an imaginary 
and uncharitably ascribed discriminatory refusal to serve individuals [based on] their sexual 
orientation.” Id. at 20. The same can be said about those who unreservedly serve the LGBT-
community, as Koppelman points out: “[W]henever someone refuses to discriminate against 
gays, that person is often perceived as making a statement of approval of homosexual 
conduct.” KOPPELMAN, supra note 38, at 37.  
 300. Legal Scholar’s Brief, supra note 17, at 8. 
 301. Id. at 8, 9 (“Stutzman’s religious objection is to same-sex marriage, regardless of the 
sexual orientation of the parties to the marriage, not to serving individuals based on their 
sexual orientation.”). 
 302. Id. at 10. 
 303. See Lind, supra note 154, at 95 (providing a nineteenth century example where John 
Marshall created a fiction of “vessel personification” that “grew to become the preeminent 
American theory of the ship”); Del Mar, supra note 179, 246–48 providing a twentieth 
century example from the House of Lords involving a fiction that “allowed the law to adapt 
and remain responsive to the claims of plaintiffs in personal injury litigation”); TWO BODIES, 
supra note 159, at 36 (“fictions are by no means extinct”); FULLER, supra note 154, at 93 (We 
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considered as a type of assumption.305 This makes a normative shift from 
one to the other much easier and much more appropriate, especially “where 
the operative fact is probable.”306 This conceptual nearness (especially with 
conclusive presumptions)307 provides an opportunity for fixing the non-
distinction approach by making a relatively small cognitive transition that 
still allows for antidiscrimination laws to retain their purpose, while also 
allowing for First Amendment defenses. 
In comparing a fiction with a presumption, Vaihinger defines the former 
as a statement where its opposite is already certain, while the latter is a 
temporary hold until the opposite is established.308 Fuller describes fictions 
                                                                                                                                      
know that the fiction is being used in contemporary law. . . . [Judges] will probably continue 
to use [fictions] in the future.”); Smith, supra note 159, at 147 (“[T]he law is not only 
encumbered by old fictions, but is in danger of having new ones foisted upon it.”). 
 304. This closeness is exemplified in examples such as the concept of “constructive 
notice” where the court would assume that the party had actual notice (despite no actual 
evidence) by a showing that the party was in a position where he should have known, but for 
some fault of his own did not. See Lobban, supra note 101, at 219. Another example in 
premise liability called the “attractive nuisance” doctrine assumes a landowner invited 
children onto his property and hold him liable for any harm by virtue of the outcome being 
foreseeable. Id. n.109. Like the common law examples listed above, the doctrine of “attractive 
nuisance” is part of the tapestry in “exploratory fiction” that allowed common law judges to 
“feel their way incrementally towards some new legal principle or theory.” K. Scott 
Hamilton. Prologomenon to myth and fiction in legal reasoning, common law adjudication 
and critical legal studies, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1449 (1989). 
 305. Raymundo Gama, Presumptions and Fictions: A Collingwoodian Approach, in LEGAL 
FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 348 (2015). Baker notes the fashion of calling 
“irrebuttable presumptions” as “living and healthy examples of the fiction.” TWO BODIES, 
supra note 159, at 38. 
 306. See Del Mar, supra note 179, at 232–33. Fuller writes that between employing 
fictions, presumptions, or estoppels, “[w]hich device will be employed depends upon which 
is most expedient.” FULLER, supra note 154, at 75. 
 307. Taking Fuller’s definition, like fictions, conclusive presumptions are generally 
applied when the opposite is known to be true. FULLER, supra note 154, at 41. He offers the 
example in the context of a grantee presumed to have accepted a gift despite the individual 
having no knowledge of the gift and could not have accepted it. Id. Fuller writes that 
conclusive presumptions “‘attach[] to any given possibility a degree of certain to which it 
normally has no right.’” Id. at 42 (quoting TOURTOULON, supra note 165, at 398). In this way, 
it can be compared to when courts assume that a denial of request is tantamount to a denial 
of the individual’s identity, thereby creating a conclusive presumption without an offer for 
rebuttal. If the difference is not clear, the advantage gained is that transitioning will be easier 
from legal fictions, to conclusive then rebuttable presumptions.  
 308. See Kelsen, supra note 95, at 10–11. One can imagine this in an instance where a 
man is in the country when his wife conceives a child from an adulterous relationship and 
everyone knows it. A legal fiction would treat this man as if he was the father, attaching all 
the legal norms and duties that would normally attach if the child was conceived in wedlock. 
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as an assumption “known to be false” while “a presumption (whether 
conclusive or rebuttable) assumes something that may possibly be true.”309 
Particularly with rebuttable presumptions, this assumption can also be 
something that is probably true.310 To say this another way, a legal fiction 
can be read as a “necessary deviation from reality” while a presumption is a 
“contingent conformity with truth.”311 When courts employ the non-
distinction approach, they are consciously affirming the non-existence of 
some reality instead of seeing it as a potential truth. For example, when 
courts refuse to delve into the difference between status and conduct by 
simply conflating the two based on some doctrine of “inextricabe 
connectivity,” what the court is saying is not that we are assuming that no 
difference exists, but for the purpose of the law, no difference actually 
exists—contrary to reality. The language, for example, by the judge in 
Sweetcakes by Melissa is clear that he believed that the case was not about a 
wedding cake, but about a business’s refusal to serve someone because of 
their sexual orientation—despite the fact that the Klein family, like 
Barronelle Stutzman and Jack Phillips, plead that their refusal had nothing 
to do with the individual’s sexual orientation.  
Whatever the distinctions are, it is best to suspend the legal fiction 
and/or a conclusive presumption approach and adopt an approach based on 
a rebuttal presumption.312 Del Mar sets this up well when he differentiates 
between legal fictions as suspensions of operative facts and presumptions as 
considerations of the likelihood of an operative fact being present, allowing 
for its introduction, but afterwards shifting the burden to the opposing 
                                                                                                                                      
While Kelsen has qualms about the reality of this analogy offered by Vaihinger, he does agree 
that “[a] fiction . . . would only emerge if one identified this legal notion of a ‘father’ with the 
natural object of the male progenitor who bears the same name.” Id. at 11. 
 309. FULLER, supra note 154, at 40. 
 310. Id. Fuller notes that the difference between a rebuttable presumption and conclusive 
ones may in some cases be a matter of degree—admitting further that the “mental process 
involved in the invention of the ordinary fiction is at least a close relation to that involved in 
the establishment of a presumption, and suggests the possibility that there may be a 
primitive, undifferentiated form of thought that includes both.” Id. at 42, 48; see also Smith, 
supra note 159, at 155 (offers conclusive presumptions as examples of surviving fictions). 
This supports that the mental step required for transitioning between a fiction to a rebuttable 
presumption is not so dramatic. 
 311. Gama, supra note 305, at 348. 
 312. One helpful conceptual definition is that a presumption “sometimes describes a 
statement about the usual connection between two facts, according to which the assertion of 
the existence of one of these facts entitles one to presume the existence of another fact.” 
Gama, supra note 305, at 355. In our case, judges can assume that rejecting a request by a 
minority group may very well be the product of bigotry, but not always as evidenced in the 
Hands on Original and Azucar Bakery cases. 
720 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:663 
 
party for an opportunity to rebut.313 This approach is reinforced by Nicholas 
Rescher’s “cognitive presumptions” definition that says presumptions are 
created for filling the gaps in our information “until there is evidence to the 
contrary.”314  
Looking to the facts in the above-mentioned cases and our operative fact 
being that a distinction in fact does exist, a conceptual shift from fictions to 
presumptions would allow for the court to assume the non-distinction 
approach so long as the opposing parties are given an opportunity to rebut 
this presumption.  
C. Rebuttable Presumption Model 
Whatever the advantages of my rebuttable presumption approach, the 
transition would at least provide the legal community explanatory evidence 
as to how the court made its decision. Where fictions are often disguised in 
legal language and undetectable intent, presumptions have the advantage of 
being explicit in their use—allowing parties to understand the principles 
being applied and what behavior is expected of them for compliance.315 This 
rebuttal will require a three-step burden of proof, focusing on: sincerity, 
expressive acts, and readily available alternative.316 
1. Sincerity 
Generally for judges, the veracity of a claimant’s belief cannot be 
challenged.317 The Supreme Court in United States v. Ballard quoting a 
                                                                                                                                      
 313. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 226. He also acknowledges the possibility to simply 
refuse to accept proof on the issue so as to make it a conclusive presumption. Id.  
 314. Gama, supra note 305, at 358; see also Edna Ullman-Margalit, On Presumption, 80 J. 
OF PHIL. 143, 151 (1983) (“[I]t may turn out that the very point of some presumption rules . . 
. [is to provide] the agent with a baseline for action which is to be abandoned just in case 
some counter indication is more or less thrust upon him.”).  
 315. See TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 49 (stating that the “use of words such as 
‘presume’ . . . is an open indication of how the speaker is using words and extending 
principles”); cf. 15 Williston on Contracts § 44:12 (4th ed.) (“[I]t is better to state the law in 
terms of reality if for no other reason than to prevent confusion.”). By replacing the non-
distinction approach with the shifting burden analysis described above, courts will take a 
“step toward a sensible reconciliation of the laws and policies promoting both 
antidiscrimination and religious and expressive freedom.” Legal Scholar’s Brief, supra note 
17, at 15. 
 316. Recall that Del Mar’s approach “is one closely related to the ways in which a court 
manages or adapt to difficulties of proof.” Del Mar, supra note 179, at 237. This methodology 
should reduce these concerns given the jurisprudence behind sincerity and the already 
available proof for what is and is not an expressive act. 
 317. Anna Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, 3(1) OXFORD J. LAW & RELIGION 28, 31 (2016). 
The Internal Revenue Service has noted in its manual that it “can’t consider the content or 
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decision form 1872 noted that the “law knows no heresy, and is committed 
to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.”318 Of course, this 
notion was not new in the 1940s—or the 1870s. The idea of disallowing 
judges to question the truthfulness of religious dogma was stated by James 
Madison when he wrote that allowing for this 
implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent judge of 
Religious Truth; or that he may employ Religion as an engine of 
Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the 
contradictory opinions of Rules in all ages, and throughout the 
world: the second an unhallowed perversion of the means of 
salvation.319 
                                                                                                                                      
source of a [lawful] doctrine alleged to constitute a particular religion.” Internal Revenue 
Serv., Internal Revenue Manual, Part 4.76.6 (Oct. 24, 2014), 
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-076-006.html#d0e698; see also Tracey, supra note 
288, at 111 (“[T]he IRS must give deference to what the organization calls religious.”). 
 318. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S 78, 86 (1944) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 
679, 728 (1872)) (internal quotations omitted). The Court went on to write: 
[w]ith man’s relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they 
impose, and the manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his 
belief on those subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the 
laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of 
its people, are not interfered with. 
Id. at 87 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)); see also James Madison, 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in WRITINGS (Library of 
Congress 1999) (“Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of 
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate”); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (“[T]he [First] Amendment embraces two 
concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of 
things, the second cannot be.”). 
 319. Madison, supra note 318, at 32. Commenting on disestablishment of religion as a 
means to protecting the basic principles of separation of church and state, Jefferson wrote 
that disestablishment prohibited government “from intermeddling with religious 
institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises” and from “the power of effecting any 
uniformity of time or matter among them. Fasting & prayer are religious exercises. The 
enjoining them is an act of discipline. Every religious society has a right to determine for 
itself the time for these exercises, & the objects proper for them, according to their own 
peculiar tenets.” Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Rev. Samuel Miller [1808], in WRITINGS 1186–87 
(Library of Congress 1984). See generally JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 60 (4th ed. 2016).  
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These sentiments go further back to John Locke who circumscribed the 
jurisdiction of the state to those things unrelated to salvation—noting that 
“the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate.”320 
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this ideal again and again in 
subsequent cases. It has stated that the door of the Free Exercise Clause 
stands tightly closed to: government regulation of religious beliefs,321 
punishment of doctrines the government finds false,322 question the 
centrality of a particular belief,323 nor condition a benefit on violating a 
religious tenet.324 Richard Garnett says this plainly: “[P]ublic officials may 
inquire into the sincerity, but not the consistency, reasonableness, or 
orthodoxy of religious beliefs.”325 The Tenth Circuit summarized these 
principles well in its Hobby Lobby decision when it wrote that the claimants 
had “drawn a line at providing coverage for drugs or devices they consider 
to induce abortions, and it is not for us to question whether the line is 
reasonable.”326 This does not mean that judges cannot hold orthodox 
                                                                                                                                      
 320. Su, supra note 317, at 31. See also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the 
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 368 (2002); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 218 (Shapiro ed. 2003).  
 321. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963).  
 322. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“[G]overnment may not compel 
affirmation of religious belief, punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be 
false, impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.”) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (“[T]o condition the availability of 
benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith 
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.”); Thomas v. Review Bd. 
Of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be accepted, 
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment 
protection.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in . . . religion.”); accord Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751, 2778–79 (2014).  
 323. Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Smith, 374 U.S. at 886-87. The Court 
has also “reject[ed] the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one 
must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization.” Frazee v. Ill. 
Dept. of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989). 
 324. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981). 
 325. Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We 
Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 848 (2009) 
 326. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d at 1114, 1141 (2013), accord Thomas, 
450 U.S. at 715. 
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beliefs, but it does mean that in the arena of judicial decision-making, 
judges are to refrain from deciding questions relating to orthodoxy.327 
However, courts are given some latitude to distinguish a sincerely held 
religious belief with a sham purpose or pretext in an effort to obtain the 
benefit of law.328 Looking again to the Tenth Circuit, the court, in 
examining a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), summarized this discretion well when it wrote 
that sincerity requires determining whether a claimant “is seeking to 
perpetrate a fraud on the court” or “whether he actually holds the beliefs he 
claims to hold.”329 In extreme cases, a court can also refuse to acknowledge a 
“claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled 
to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”330 With the cases mentioned 
above, I would even promote the introduction of extrinsic evidence (e.g. 
statements, publications) to show invidious intent—an approach used with 
the so-called Muslim travel ban issued by President Trump. 
2. Expressive act 
The second step in this analysis requires that the public accommodation 
is one that engages in expressive acts protecting by the First Amendment.331 
Those who argue for exemptions for the florists, bakers, and photographers 
base their thinking by showing how these businesses engage in artistic 
services.332  
For example, in the Elane Photography, leading First Amendment 
scholars Eugene Volokh and Dale Carpenter filed an amicus brief where 
                                                                                                                                      
 327. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious 
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (“Government must keep out of internal 
problems of religious bodies when those problems concern religious understandings.”). 
 328. Su, supra note 317, at 32; see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) 
(“[P]rison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner's religiosity, asserted as 
the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic.”); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 
163, 185 (1965) (stating that the “threshold question of sincerity” is whether a belief is “truly 
held”); Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 n.28 (“[A] corporation's pretextual assertion of a religious 
belief in order to obtain an exemption for financial reasons would fail.”). 
 329. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014); Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 
1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 330. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715; see also Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, 178 F. Supp. 3d 819, 830 (D. 
Neb. 2016) (holding that FSMism [i.e., Flying Spaghetti Monster] is beyond the protection of 
RLUIPA); Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (stating that the eating cat 
food was not a religious belief entitled to constitutional protection).  
 331. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602–03 (1998) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“[A]rtistic expression lies within this First Amendment protection.”). 
 332. See Haley Holik, You Have the Right to Speak by Remaining Silent: Why a State 
Sanction to Create a Wedding Cake Is Compelled Speech, 28 REGENT U. L. REV. 299 (2016). 
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they argued that photography is fully protected by the First Amendment, 
regardless if the service is being offered for money.333 They argued that 
while neither political nor scientific speech is present, the right enjoyed by 
Elane Photography is still protected as a “special case of the broader 
proposition that visual expression is as protected as verbal expression.”334 
They base their arguments largely on Supreme Court precedent in Wooley 
v. Maynard, where a license plate slogan that read “Live Free or Die” was 
successfully challenged on a claim that forcing the plaintiff to display it on 
their car breached a long-standing prohibition on government compelled 
speech that states an individual is protected from being compelled to 
become a “courier for [the government’s] message.”335 Based largely on this 
precedent,336 if photography is an expressive act protected by the First 
Amendment, then the doctrine set-out in Wooley protects Elane 
Photography337 from being forced to comply with the request to photograph 
a wedding or display such photos on the company’s website.338  
                                                                                                                                      
 333. Cato Institute Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellants, at 8, Elane Photography v. 
Willock (N.M. 2014), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/Elane-
Photog-filed-brief.pdf. 
 334. Id.  
 335. Id. at 6 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 714, 717 (1977)) “The First 
Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the 
majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find 
morally objectionable.” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.  
 336. The Brief also relied on a Supreme Court case out of West Virginia involving a high 
school requirement to salute the American flag—deciding likewise that to force the student 
to do so amounted to compelled speech. See West Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943). The compelled speech idea was also emphasized in Hurley v. GLIB when the 
Supreme Court wrote that “one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is 
that one who chooses to speak may also decide ‘what not to say.’” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. Public Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (plurality opinion)); see also Pacific Gas, 475 
U.S. at 11 (“[A]ll speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave 
unsaid”); Cato Institute Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellants, at 12, Elane Photography 
v. Willock (N.M. 2014), available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/Elane-Photog-filed-brief.pdf. (stating that 
the “compelling the creation of speech (including for money) interferes with the ‘individual 
freedom of mind’ at least as much as compelling the dissemination of speech does”). 
 337. See Cato Institute Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellants, at 11-12, Elane 
Photography v. Willock (N.M. 2014), available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/Elane-Photog-filed-brief.pdf.( stating that 
the “requiring someone to create speech is even more of an imposition . . . than is requiring 
the person to simply engage in ‘the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license 
plate’”). 
 338. Id. at 9. 
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Similarly, in Arlene’s Flowers, a number of amicus briefs argued that the 
refusal to create a floral arrangement for a same-sex wedding is also 
protected under the compelled speech doctrine. The Cato Institute, a 
libertarian think-tank, offered an extensive dive into the expressive 
significance of floral design—pointing out the existence of a number of 
schools of floristry art around the world, as well as various cases that 
recognized the various art forms protected under the First Amendment.339 
The Becket Fund, a premier First Amendment non-profit, also emphasized 
the communicative message of Mrs. Stutzman’s services, noting that in 
creating a flower arrangement, the “florist must integrate her understanding 
of the couple with her own artistic style, and create a theme that carries 
through all parts of the wedding[.]”340 
Others have likewise argued, in support of Masterpiece Bakery, that 
baking a cake is a communicative act protected by the First Amendment.341  
a. Non-application of certain cases 
On the other hand, under this prong, cases like the Tennessean man who 
put-up a sign stating “No Gays Allowed,” 342 the Norwegian hairstylist who 
refused to serve a woman wearing hijab,343 or the Social Security 
Administration employee who claimed watching a short video on LGBT 
diversity would amount to endorsing “an abomination,”344 would lose 
                                                                                                                                      
 339. See Cato Institute Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellants, at 5–10, Arlene’s 
Flowers v. Ingersoll (Wash. 2016), available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/arlene-flowe-cover.pdf.  
 340. Beckett Fund Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellants, at 8, Arlene’s Flowers v. 
Ingersoll (Wash. 2016), available at 
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A08/916152%20Amicus%20-
%20The%20Becket%20Fund.pdf.  
 341. See Holik, supra note 332, at 302–05 (“Over hundreds of years, wedding cakes 
evolved with the advancement of culinary art.”). 
 342. Tennessee hardware store puts up ‘No Gays Allowed’ sign, USA TODAY (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/07/01/tennessee-hardware-store-
no-gays-allowed-sign/29552615/. The man later replaced the sign with: "We reserve the right 
to refuse service to anyone who would violate our rights of freedom of speech & freedom of 
religion." Id. 
 343. Norwegian hairdresser could be jailed for refusing salon entry to woman with hijab, 
RT NEWS (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.rt.com/viral/358353-norwegian-hairdresser-hijab-jail/. 
The woman later commented on Facebook: “Lawful? Maybe not. But we still have freedom 
of speech?" Id.  
 344. Ben Guarino, ‘I’m not going to certify sin’: Social Security worker refuses to watch 
LGBT training video, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 14, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/14/im-not-going-to-
certify-sin-social-security-worker-refuses-to-watch-lgbt-training-video/. The man “cited his 
right under the Constitution to religious freedom in support of his refusal.” Id. 
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despite making similar defenses. The Supreme Court in O’Brien was right 
when it refused to “accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of 
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the 
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”345 Providing this layer of 
stratification346 will further emphasize the distinct nature of artistic services 
versus those individuals who behave in discriminatory fashion like those 
instances surrounding the Fair Housing Act of 1968347 and Bob Jones 
University.  
Two recent examples of individuals who fall outside the protection of 
this approach are worth noting. Both instances involve the type of 
discriminatory practices rightfully targeted by antidiscrimination laws and 
both instances create troubling ramifications for other religious liberty 
issues. 
The first is the case out of Illinois where the owners of the TimberCreek 
Bed & Breakfast refused to host any and all “same-sex civil unions” and 
“same-sex weddings.”348 In a series of email exchanges with the gay couple, 
one of the business owners, James Walder (“Respondent”), made it explicit 
that he believed that “homosexuality is wrong and unnatural based on what 
the Bible says” and would under no circumstances host a same-sex 
marriage.349 In response, one of the couples, Todd Wathen (“Petitioner”), 
told Mr. Walder that the State of Illinois in passing the Illinois Human 
Rights Act made it illegal to discriminate against people on the basis of their 
sexual orientation and that, as a business, they need to comply with the law 
                                                                                                                                      
 345. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 346. Professor Wilson provides helpful content on this point, noting that “objector’s 
claim weakens when it extends to services routinely provided by commercial entities, such as 
renting a banquet hall . . . [and] when less direct actions are at stake” in respects to providing 
a commercial service. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 160. 
 347. Prior to the passage of the Act, “religious white landlords” considered leasing their 
premises to blacks a violation of the tenets of their faith on race mixing. See Eskridge, supra 
note 53, at 677 (“Act required landlords leasing more than three units to refrain from race 
discrimination”). 
 348. Wathen v. Walder Vacuflo, Inc., Charge No. 2011SP2489 (Illinois Human Rights 
Commission Sept. 15, 2015), available at 
http://www.paxtonrecord.net/sites/all/files/pdf/2015/09/17/Wathen-liability-
determination.pdf; see also Vikki Ortiz Healy, Ruling sides with same-sex couple turned away 
by bed-and-breakfast, CHICAGO TRIB. (Sept. 17, 2015) (discussion on background and ruling 
by the Illinois’ Human Rights Commission), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-lgbt-business-services-decision-met-
20150917-story.html.  
 349. Wathen, supra note 348, at 5. The Commission would later call this “discriminatory 
animosity.” Id. at 18. 
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and “keep their opinions to there [sic] self.”350 In its discussion, the 
Commission made two noteworthy points.  
First, the Respondent tried to argue that the First Amendment protects 
their right of refusal because the expressive act involved in same-sex unions 
is transferred (i.e., “conduit” theory) onto the hosts.351  The argument made 
is that to open the Respondent’s venue to host same-sex ceremonies is 
tantamount to the compelled speech instances prohibited under the First 
Amendment.352 The host in providing the venue is implicitly endorsing the 
message that “two individuals in love can enter into a relationship that 
mimics marriage in contravention to certain passage in the Bible.”353 The 
Commissioner based its rejection of this argument on the fact that the 
newly acquired state rights for same-sex unions (under the “Religious 
Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act”) coupled with the Human Rights 
Act is what mandates the Respondent to treat all-comers alike and the 
Respondent had not alleged that it is against their religion to treat 
individuals equally.354  
Second, the Commissioner also noted that the Respondent would likely 
fail in showing a substantial burden under Illinois’ Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) since their presence may not be required and 
they in either case allow for same-sex guests to rent out a rooms without 
inquiring into their sexual orientation.355 While the Commissioner is 
treading dangerously close to the line of appropriate inquiry under RFRA’s 
sincerity prong—arguable too far by connecting inconsistent application of 
belief356 as evidence of insincerity—its general approach in being skeptical 
that a substantial burden can be met is likely correct since Respondent’s 
“participation” in the same-sex wedding goes only so far as providing a 
venue and related services.357 The Commissioner is also right to reject the 
“conduit” theory if for no other reason than for the troubling cross-
application it has for other religious liberty issues (discussed below).  
The second case comes out of Idaho where owners of the wedding venue 
(Hitching Post) refused to allow a same-sex wedding to take place on their 
property. While this case provides little to the discussion above, one thing is 
                                                                                                                                      
 350. Id. at 6.  
 351. Id. at 24. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. (citing Respondent’s reply brief at 19). 
 354. Wathen, supra note 348 at 25. 
 355. See id. at 22–23 (stating that the “in both cases all that Respondent would be 
required to do is to provide a space for its same-sex guests to conduct an activity”). 
 356. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, 
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”). 
 357. See Wathen, supra note 348, at 25. 
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important to note is that the Hitching Post won their case in settling with 
the city because it “reorganized as a religious corporation.”358 Perhaps 
changing the status of one’s business is a prudent first option instead of 
dragging on a lawsuit or simply shutting down for good.359  
b. Advantage of non-application 
Escaping litigations in instances where the issue involves no artistic 
services is the prudent route. Avoiding litigation allows individuals to save 
time, money, and face before the court of public opinion. Adding to this is 
the benefit of avoiding setting bad precedent (even if you win) that may 
allow lawyers to argue that opening a venue for certain events is tantamount 
to an endorsement. This creates troubling precedent in two important 
religious liberty issues: Equal Access and Graduation Prayer. 
The earliest significant equal access case was decided by the Supreme 
Court in Windmar v. Vincent (1981),360 codified in its application to public 
high schools by the Equal Access Act of 1984,361 and subsequently 
                                                                                                                                      
 358. Jake Thomas, Hitching Post lawsuit settled by city of Coeur d’Alene, INLANDER (May 
3, 2016), http://www.inlander.com/Bloglander/archives/2016/05/03/hitching-post-lawsuit-
settled-by-city-of-coeur-dalene; see also Scott Maben, Coeur d’Alene wedding chapel suit ends 
in $1,000 judgment, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (May 3, 2016), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2016/may/03/coeur-dalene-wedding-chapel-suit-ends-
in-1000-judg/. 
 359. See Kelsey Harkness, Fearing Another Lawsuit, Christian Business Owners Stopped 
Hosting All Weddings, Now Their Business Is Dead, DAILY SIGNAL (June 19, 2015), 
http://dailysignal.com/2015/06/19/fearing-another-lawsuit-christian-business-owners-
stopped-hosting-all-weddings-now-their-business-is-dead/. This much was suggested by 
Joseph Singer who said that “we must define the parts of social life where we allow owners to 
exclude based on religion.” Singer, supra note 5, at 940. Another option as some have already 
done be to file “pre-enforcement challenges” challenging existing state laws that would 
interfere with a person’s right to refuse requests towards same-sex weddings. See Brush & 
Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix, Case No. CV2016-052251 (Sup. Ct. Maricopa, May 12, 2016), 
available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/BrushNibComplaint.pdf; 303 Creative LLC v. 
Lenis, Case No. 1:16-cv-02372 (D.C. Colorado, Sept. 20, 2016), 
https://adflegal.blob.core.windows.net/web-content-dev/docs/default-
source/documents/case-documents/303-creative-v.-elenis/303-creative-v-elenis---
complaint.pdf?sfvrsn=4.  
 360. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (concluded that the University of Missouri 
could not deny equal access to a religious student group); W. COLE DURHAM, LAW AND 
RELIGION 524 (2010). “In early [lower court] cases, this equal access argument achieved 
mixed results but largely losses.” Timothy J. Tracey, The Demise of Equal Access and A 
Return to the Early-American Understanding of Student Rights, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 557, 565 
(2013). 
 361. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4074; see also David Brown, Hey! Universities! Leave Them Kids 
Alone!: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez and Conditioning Equal Access to a University’s 
Student-Organization Forum, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 163, 190–93 (2011) (“Congress passed the 
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reinforced by a number of decisions spanning two decades.362 The equal 
access doctrine stands for the proposition that—unless it can meet the 
highest level of scrutiny363—a public school that creates a limited public 
forum cannot discriminate in the use of that forum based on a student 
group’s desire to use it to engage in religious worship and discussion.364 
While a detailed discussion of equal access will not be the focus of this 
Article, my concern is that if courts accept the logic that hosting a same-sex 
marriage is synonymous with endorsing the underlying act, then in equal 
access cases, parties seeking a strict separation of church and state will argue 
that the same is true in violation of the Establishment Clause when public 
schools provide open forums for religious activities.365 This fear is 
exacerbated further given the Supreme Court decision in Martinez, which 
upheld “all-comers” policies that allow universities to withhold benefits if a 
                                                                                                                                      
[Equal Access] Act because courts were ignoring and misconstruing the Supreme Court's 
holding in Widmar”). The Act applies the doctrine set up in Widmar to public high 
schools—stating that it is  
unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial 
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair 
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a 
meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, 
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings. 
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a). Applying the logic from Widmar, Justice O’Connor wrote that the 
message of the Equal Access Act “is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a State 
refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not 
neutrality but hostility toward religion.” Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comty. Sch. v. Mergens, 
496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 362. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Lamb’s 
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector 
and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford 
Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 363. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270 (“University must . . . satisfy the standard of review 
appropriate to content-based exclusions”); Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07 (“restriction 
must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint . . . and the restriction must 
be ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum’”) (internal citations removed). 
 364. See generally Tracey, supra note 360, at 564–72 (outlines the history of the equal 
access); JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 180–88 
(2016) (“The principal logic of these cases is that religious students and other parties must be 
given equal access to facilitates, forum, and even funds that the public school makes available 
to similarly situated nonreligious parties.”).  
 365. This line of argumentation based on the fears of violating the Establishment Clause 
has been consistently used and disposed of by the Court. See, e.g. Lamb’s Chapel, 598 U.S at 
395; Mark W. Cordes, Schools, Worship, and the First Amendment, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 9, 
22 (2015). However, the Court in Good News Club acknowledged valid forms of arguments 
attach based on the Establishment Clause. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120; see also 
(acknowledging tension between Establishment Clause and Free Clause). 
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student organization conditions leadership on the basis of status or belief.366 
According to some scholars, Martinez has killed off equal access at 
universities.367 The language of Justice Stevens is indicative of this 
conclusion when he wrote in Martinez that schools “need not subsidize 
[religious groups], give them its official imprimatur, or grant them equal 
access to law school facilities.”368 Justice Alito in his dissent expressed his 
concerns that the majority has created a new “principle: no freedom for 
expression that offends prevailing standards of political correctness in our 
country’s institutions of higher learning.”369  
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Bronx Household of Faith moved away 
from what appeared to be a straightforward application of the equal access 
doctrine—deciding instead that excluding religious worship services does 
not violate the Free Speech Clause or the Free Exercise Clause.370 The 
Circuit went so far as to strongly suggest that including worship services 
might even be a violation of the Establishment Clause based on an 
endorsement of religion.371  
This same concern emerges also in the context of graduation prayer—
already in a precarious position.372 If claimants win under the theory that 
accommodating certain events amounts to endorsing those events, then the 
question of having private student prayers during a school facilitated 
graduation ceremony will likely trigger Establishment Clause challenges. 
                                                                                                                                      
 366. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
 367. Tracey, supra note 360, at 559. 
 368. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 703 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 369. Id. at 706 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 370. Cordes, supra note 365, at 12. 
 371. Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 40–44 (2011); DANIEL O. 
CONKLE, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 86 n. 45 (2016) (stating that the “court 
found that the exclusion was justified by the school board’s reasonable fear of violating the 
Establishment Clause”); see also Cordes, supra note 365, at 28–33 (discussing the decision in 
depth). Nothing short of a heckler’s veto mentioned in Good News Club subject to the 
perceptions of “the youngest members of the audience” based on a coercion analysis, this 
would allow for a de facto endorsement of religion striking down whatever remains of equal 
access. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119. 
 372. See Thomas A. Schweitzer, The Progeny of Lee v. Weisman: Can Student-Invited 
Prayer at Public School Graduations Still Be Constitutional?, 9 BYU J. PUB. L. 291, 291 (1995) 
(stating that the “[a]fter Lee, numerous observers concluded that the Court had outlawed any 
form of prayer at public school graduations”); Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and 
Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 810 (2001) (noting that few school policies are likely to survive 
after Santa Fe given how most are rooted in a historical purpose of having a prayer at 
graduation). I argue that a balance is still available so long as the prayer is genuinely student-
initiated and the school removes itself from the process. See Anton Sorkin, Graduation 
Ceremonies: A Prayer for Balancing Sponsorship & Censorship, 41 SIU L. J. 345 (2017). 
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The result will likely be synonymous with circuit court decisions that 
consider prayer during a graduation a form of an endorsement of religion 
by virtue of the school providing a venue and related services.373  
The next Section returns to our three-part framework for rebuttable 
presumptions, moving into the final step. 
3. Readily Available Alternatives 
This language is imported from forum analysis cases (although the 
principles can be traced further back)374 involving proscribed acts of 
content-based discrimination and appropriate time, place, and manner 
restrictions on speech. Underlying this Section is the ideal of political 
independence described by Richard Dworkin as a “right that no one suffer 
disadvantage in the distribution of goods or opportunities on the ground 
that others think he should have less because of who he is or is not.”375 
While the Section argues that goods must be equally available, it does not 
argue that it is the role of the state to ensure that the burden of collecting 
those goods remains equal for all people. Sometimes people will need to 
drive slightly further so that others can enjoy their First Amendment 
privileges, e.g., a peaceful assembly may require a detour. 
When considering between destroying a person’s livelihood and 
protecting people from systematic discrimination, the goal should be to 
place the victim as close as possible to the place he would have been had the 
discrimination not occurred, but, at the same time, being mindful of the 
scale of corresponding action necessary to remedy the magnitude of 
                                                                                                                                      
 373. See, e.g., A.M. ex rel. McKay v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 510 F. App'x 3, 8 (2d 
Cir. 2013); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995). In another interesting case, the court while dealing 
with a religiously-theme musical selection for graduation, concluded that the “requirement 
that all musical selections be secular was a reasonable action taken to avoid confrontation 
with the Establishment Clause.” Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Looking to the “legitimate pedagogical purpose” for suppressing student speech, the Tenth 
Circuit has even allowed censoring religious expressions of faith based on a desire to avoid 
confrontation. See Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 48, 566 F.3d 1219, 1228–29 (10th 
Cir. 2009). The Court—considering whether requiring a valedictorian to apologize prior to 
receiving her diploma after sharing her faith without school permission—noted that the 
“School District is entitled to review the content of speeches in an effort to preserve 
neutrality on matters of controversy within a school environment” and that “the School 
District's unwritten policy of reviewing valedictory speeches prior to the graduation 
ceremony was reasonably related to pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 1230. 
 374. See Courtney, supra note 32, at 1504–06 (discussing the logic of the “economic 
theory” at common law that warranted public accommodations to serve based on concerns 
of virtual monopolies). 
 375. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 364 (1985). 
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harm.376  The Supreme Court, mindful that an absolute right to speak does 
not exist in every conceivable location,377 details a number of elements that 
could reasonably be included as part of this third-prong of the rebuttable 
presumption analysis. Where time, place, and manner restrictions are 
imposed, courts are required to consider as part of their analysis whether 
alternative forums for the expression is available.378 If courts determine that 
the restriction aims to prevent completely the dissemination of certain 
forms of expression379 or if the remaining modes of communication are 
inadequate,380 the restriction will need to pass the highest level of scrutiny 
without the option to “justify a content-based prohibition by showing that 
speakers have alternative means of expression.”381 
Taking on this language, we can apply the principles in instances when a 
same-sex couple faces minimal hardship in finding their services elsewhere. 
Even if a party argues that a forum possesses some level of convenience or 
advantage, courts are still able to consider why those “same advantages 
cannot be obtained through other means.”382 As Justice Stevens noted, 
“Although the Court has shown special solicitude for forms of expression 
that are much less expensive than feasible alternatives and hence may be 
important to a large segment of the citizenry . . . this solicitude has practical 
boundaries.”383  
While this prong may present some unique factual circumstances,384 for 
the cases above, the same-sex couples have had no trouble finding other 
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reading of Ronald Dworkin. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 13, 25.  
 377. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 
647 (1981); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 
U.S. 395, 405 (1953). 
 378. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980); 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 (1976).  
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Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
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 380. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) 
 381. Consol. Edison 447 U.S. at 541 n.10 (internal citations omitted). 
 382. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812. Note the Court’s language: “[N]othing in the 
findings indicates that the posting of political posters on public property is a uniquely 
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 383. Id. at 812 n.30 (internal citations omitted). 
 384. For example, in a case dealing with the use of a municipal facility to put on a 
controversial musical, the Court in discussing alternatives noted that other facilities may not 
have “the seating capacity, acoustical features, stage equipment, and electrical service that the 
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sellers (limited impact) who were more than willing to accommodate their 
requests (at times for free). This last step, in requiring alternatives, has been 
incorporated into “model statutes” by leading scholars using the language of 
“substantial hardship” in their attempts to balance the rights of LGBT-
members and religious business owners.385  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that this “non-distinction approach” is really a legal 
fiction (something counter to known facts), which advances the interest of 
the courts in using antidiscrimination laws for socially engineering an 
atmosphere that protects the LGBT-community from dignitary harms. 
While an important process, the pursuit has been done by incorrectly 
conflating the forms of discrimination (i.e., identity vs. conduct) thereby 
disarming the potential for First Amendment defenses to shine light on the 
conflict.  
My solution is simple. Courts should replace the legal fiction (i.e., non-
distinction approach) with a rebuttable presumption. They can still assume 
that the discriminatory intent is the type that is rightfully invidious, but 
courts should provide an opportunity for religious claimants to rebut that 
presumption by: (1) showing a sincerely held belief; (2) showing that the 
requested service is part of those expressive acts protected by the First 
Amendment; and, (3) showing that readily available alternative means exist 
for acquiring the sought after services. 
Coincidentally, the concurring judge in Elane Photography sets us on the 
right path despite the outcome of the case:  
At its heart, this case teaches that at some point in our lives all of 
us must compromise, if only a little, to accommodate the 
contrasting values of others . . . That compromise is part of the 
glue that holds us together as a nation, the tolerance that 
lubricates the varied moving parts of us as a people. That sense of 
respect we owe others, whether or not we believe as they do, 
                                                                                                                                      
show required.” Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975). In 
another dealing with restrictions on posting signs on public property, the dissent argued that 
“there is no showing that [the] . . . alternatives would serve appellees' needs nearly as well as 
would the posting of signs on public property.” Taxpayer for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 820 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 385. See Letter from Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Thomas C. Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, 
Richard Garnett, & Robin Fretwell Wilson to Hawaii State Sen. Rosalyn H. Baker (Oct. 17, 
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illuminates this country, setting it apart from the discord that 
afflicts much of the rest of the world.386 
While we may not all agree on the definition of marriage, it is certainly in 
the price of citizenship that we tolerate the views of others and engage them 
in meaningful debate without retreating behind walls of rhetorical 
denigration. A common comprise must come through the furnace of 
bipartisan communication,387 where both sides adopt a policy of finding a 
solution that, in the words of George Washington, “gives to bigotry no 
sanction, to persecution no assistance.”  
As “exhilarating as it might be simply to crush one’s opposition while the 
political momentum happens to be on one’s side,” we are entering a time 
when national unity seems desperately in need and “a course of 
uncompromising intransigence operates to aggravate rather than calm 
cultural conflicts.”388 “If courts consider only the imperatives of 
antidiscrimination law, and are oblivious of the free speech issues, the 
consequences for speech are likely to be pretty bad.”389 But through this 
process, we, as a society, may lose more than we gain in our efforts to 
dictate the orthodox views on matters of sexual ethics. A core value of free 
speech and the unspoken medicinal value it provides is that it tends to 
induce a sort of “open collision of moral views” leading to an “open clash 
between earnestly held ideals and opinions about the nature and basis of a 
good life.”390 While this Article provides a fairly narrow window into the 
ongoing struggles between religion and gay culture, it allows us sufficient 
landscape to begin considering the direction we want to take and the good 
life that awaits us in a more perfect union. 
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